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(NATO Individual Research Fellowship 1995-1997)
Alexander Siedschlag

Abstract
In its consequences for the future role of the Atlantic Alliance, the system-change in
Europe means more than what it is commonly conceived of to be. Much of the political
and scholarly debates about NATO's future embrace military conflict management and
Alliance enlargement as crucial factors. Yet another set of decisive factors determining
NATO's future lies in the intra-Alliance political and military relationships. The
immediate challenges in the first place stem from conflicts of internal origin, such as
reconciling divergent interests and approaches among its members.
NATO's approach of institutional adaptation to the post-Cold War European landscape in the period
between 1990 and 1997 followed a way from 'interlocking' to 'interacting'. The so often-invoked concept
of interlocking institutions under guidance of the Atlantic Alliance threatened to become a functionally
unspecified, more inhibiting than reinforcing juxtaposition of interblocking institutions. The Berlin
Ministerial Meeting of June 1996 marked a decisive turning point, as it gave up NATO's claim to an everleading role in the interplay of European security institutions, turning to the new principle of interacting
institutions - namely a coordinated interplay of the different European security institutions that does not
rest upon one lead-institution but rather on the idea of general common regulations for a well-defined
functional sharing. The CJTF-concept is an appropriate device to secure the success of this strategy.
The Alliance, in continuing its process of institutional adaptation and enlargement, should refrain from
adopting to diffuse political responsibilities and claiming a too broad functional spectrum in poststrategic security politics. Rather, it should adhere to functional specificity. This does not, of course,
mean that NATO should devote itself to seeking to redefine post-strategic defense and security politics
into all-out war military strategy. In the post-strategic security realm, military aspects of security by far
not only refer to classical war scenarios or military intervention but also play an important role in
peaceful management of internal conflict and democratic consolidation.
The analysis shows that NATO's specific long-standing functions enshrined in the Articles 2, 4 and 5 of
the North Atlantic Treaty have remained remarkably unquestioned and even been reaffirmed by the
system-change in Europe 1989-1991. However, NATO's procedures and politics to fulfill these functions
and realize these aims are to be redefined and where necessary redesigned due to the changed political
setting and scope in and under which it now is operating in. Primarily, NATO had, and still has, not to
redefine its functional role but its operational prerequisites to comply with it. As for theory, we need an
approach conceiving of the Alliance both as a growing political actor beyond short-term interest
calculations of its constitutive actors (the states) as well as in their continued dependence on those
constitutive actors.
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4
SED DIU MAGNUM INTER MORTALIS CERTAMEN
FUIT, VINE CORPORIS AN VIRTUTE ANIMI RES
MILITARIS MAGIS PROCEDERET ...
AC MIHI QUIDEM, TAMETSI HAUDQUAQUAM PAR
GLORIA SEQUITUR SCRIPTOREM ET ACTOREM
RERUM, TAMEN IN PRIMIS ARDUUM VIDETUR RES
GESTAS SCRIBERE, PRIMUM QUOD FACTA DICTIS
EXAEQUANDA SUNT, DEHINC QUIA PLERIQUE,
QUAE DELICTA REPREHENDERIS, MALEVOLENTIA
ET INVIDIA DICTA PUTANT ...
(C. SALLUSTIUS CRISPUS, BELLUM CATILINAE, §§ I,5 & III,2).

1. L'OTAN est morte, vive l'OTAN! - Fictions, Facts and Challenges
1.1 Old Functions Preserved, New Functions Gained
With the coming Summit of Madrid in July 1997, the Atlantic Alliance visibly will set a
milestone in the process of its institutional adaptation as rung in by the London
Declaration of July 1990. This will also mark a watershed between internal adaptation
as the Alliance’s chief preoccupation during the last seven and a half years and the step
towards its external adaptation, primarily defined in terms of enlargement. This break
was naturally more than unforeseeable in late 1994, when the project leading to this
study was outlined. Yet it is an incident political scientists usually only can dream of
that the formulation of a research report almost perfectly coincides with a decisive point
in political developments, and that these do not outdate their research but in contrast
confirm much of the related conclusions and outlooks. Thus, beyond the understandable
focusing on Alliance enlargement and its ramifications, one should not depreciate the
various other dimensions, and pivotal issues, relating to the future role of NATO.
In contrast to radical interpretations which (regardless of the dimension of Alliance enlargement) either
do not see any viable alternative and amendment to NATO in the area of post-bipolar European securityi
or deem NATO's raison d'être irretrievably vanished along with the end of the Cold Warii, one in any case
has to assume that the Alliance with its politico-military dual structure, as it has existed since its
foundation, currently exerts at least three key functions:iii First, providing for the collective defense of its
members according to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (in the face of continued but diffuse external
threats). Second, fulfilling several cooperative security functions so to establish stable relations to its
former adversaries on the soil of the erstwhile Warsaw-Pact territory (in the sense of the institutional
adaptation of its structures, for example by establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NACC,
and the bilaterally-based program of Partnership for Peace, PfPiv); this role also pertains to regional
conflict prevention and management. Third, exerting important coordinating and cooperative functions
within the Alliance itself.
On the other hand, diverse factors have indisputably amounted to cause NATO a general loss of
relevance:v The radically decreased common public perception of clear-cut threats has posed increased
compulsion to justify provisions for continued collective-defense ability in the U.S. and Western Europe;
the discussions about an own operational role for WEU and a genuine European Security and Defense
Identity (ESDI) as well as the new activism of OSCE have ended NATO's lead in questions of 'new'
European security politics; extended early-warning periods and scarce military budgets have caused
symptoms of free fall in some national force and defense structures, increasingly questioning short-term
deployability of several national force contingents.
Unexpectedly however, exactly after the loss of its adversary and subsequent growing into different
straining and controversial new security roles (such as implementing U.N. sanctions or setting up
diplomatic liaisons with the former Warsaw Pact nations), NATO has developed specific new
legitimating potentials and moreover a remarkable institutional attractiveness - obviously reaching far
beyond its mere self-preservation. This not only has become clear in the case of Middle East European
states' wishes for accession but also in the French "rapprochement"vi towards the Alliance's integrated
military structure.vii Just after the end of bipolarity and strategic security policy reflecting global interbloc confrontation, thus, NATO is on the way of developing a considerable extend of independent,
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corporate identity (or, at least, the governments of its member states are prepared - whatever the reasons to concede it a considerable extend of institutional action potential).viii

The leading assumption of the present study is that the system-change in Europe
means, in its consequences for the future role of the Atlantic Alliance, more than what it
is commonly conceived of to be. Much of the political and scholarly debates about
NATO's future embrace military conflict management and Alliance enlargement as
crucial factors for preserving its functions and relevancy. These aspects naturally are
decisive for NATO's future but by no means perfectly determine it, nor are they
sufficient to explain the actual process of its institutional adaptation since 1990.
Focusing exclusively on them tempts one to externalize the whole problématique of
NATO's institutional adaptation, only asking for 'new' external threats (conflict
management) or stabilizing outreach (enlargement and relationship to other international organizations).
Whereas naturally taking those factors into account, the present study argues that another set of crucial
factors determining NATO's future lies in the intra-Alliance political and military relationships in the face
of the prevalence of national interest-calculations on the side of its members, especially as far as peace
operations are concerned. And foremost, the actually immediate challenges which the Atlantic Alliance is
currently facing not so much result from external factors such a ethno-national conflicts but from conflicts
of internal origin, such as reconciling divergent approaches among its members to defense and security in
the post-strategic realm.
This suggests not to limit the analysis of NATO's institutional adaptation and future role to its obvious
immediate political context, that is, the Euro-regional setting, but also to delve into the national context of
Alliance politics. On the other hand, it is necessary to appreciate the broader context of post-Cold War
international relations and security as the constitutive context for the distinct European regional setting
NATO operates in.
Taking off from these underlying assumptions - which are to be laid out in greater detail beneath -, the
study will seek answers to the four following questions:
1. What is the distinct character of post-strategic European and transatlantic security and security policy
and what consequences follow for NATO's current and future institutional adaptation and functions?
2. What are the related challenges for international relations theory and scholarly analysis? What is here
the practical impact of theory in the sense of "foreign policy engineering"ix and concrete political
guideline-output?
3. What are the problematic linkages between the different contexts of post-strategic Alliance politics
and security as assumed in this study (global, regional, national) and resulting predicaments or
dilemmas in their consequences for NATO and possible future Alliance policy guidelines? Here the
national dimension is of prime importance, for the critical junctures of problems most visibly
materialize in national security strategies and Alliance politics and must primarily be dealt with on
this level. Note that NATO is an international, no supranational, organization, leaving its member
states full national sovereignty.
4. What are feasible possibilities of theoretical integration in the light of the results found? In addition,
what could be a feasible framework for post-strategic European and transatlantic security beyond the,
as will be seen unrealistic, vision of a comprehensive European security order and institutional
structure?

1.2 An Unconventional Agenda of Alliance Challenges
The particular nature of the European 'new' security 'threats' and challenges has by now
almost become conventional wisdom: They reach from nuclear proliferation over
minority problems, the Russian near-abroad doctrine with its ramifications and ethnonational conflicts up to conflicts implied in the plan for an all-European security
structure itself.x Conflict potentials and scenarios of such kind notwithstanding, it is
unlikely that we will witness in the short run any escalation comparable to the postYugoslav contingency which would thus call for an analogous resort to the Alliance's
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military capabilities and operational structures. By now it has become clear that the pivotal challenges for NATO are considerably different from strategic problems and
questions of regional stability in the narrow sense
The flexibility of NATO's goal-setting and principles had, and still has, a paradoxical effect: The Alliance
was the first European international institution to devise its post-Cold War agenda and political
guidelines, but it also was, and still is, the one to be most preoccupied with its internal adaptation, its selfpositioning within the framework of European international institutions and with reconciling divergent
national interests, which naturally also have changed with bipolarity abating. From such a vantage-point,
it is not in the first place the much-invoked 'new security threats' that pose the critical challenges for
NATO's future. Rather, it are those issues concerning the 'new' NATO's final shape itself. They include:
• The question of a European pillar of the Alliance and the extend to which it should be complemented
or paralleled by an own European Security and Defense Identity with its own operational capabilities.
• The reform of the Alliance's command and control structures.
• The question of enlargement.
• The relative importance of and relations between NATO's military and political structure and bodies.
• The symptoms of a free fall in some member state's national defense structures and short-term force
deployability.
• The general course of Alliance post-strategic security engagement.
• NATO's stance in the institutional landscape of European conflict management.
These types of challenges mainly stem from a particular set of all-regional developments in post-Cold
War Europe towards a condition of post-strategic security (a concept to be laid out in greater detail
below), which in the first place comprise the following:
• A strategic de-coupling of Europe (that is, the reduction of its immediate dependency on both U.S.
and Russian politics as well as U.S.-Russian relations) and a resulting further loss of the extraposed
stance of Europe in world affairs.
• Less allowance for de-coupling of security issues form general political trends, with increasing
linkages between security/defense policy and political integration in general being even intentionally
established. For example, political integration finds itself supplemented by an own security
component (as in the case of an envisaged defense component of the European Union) or military
integration also serves genuine political aims. This becomes obvious in the concept of Combined
Joint Task Force Headquarters, entailing important political functions such as connecting NATO and
WEU or providing a framework for security cooperation with East European states.
• Security (politics) in Europe is becoming post-spatial, increasingly influenced by sub-regional and
transnational aspects (for example ethno-national tensions, separational conflicts, minority conflicts).
This should lead to a broader security concept, within which security politics, conflict management
and peaceful settlement of conflict are no longer contrary but complementary to each other. On the
other hand, it must not be forgotten that geostrategic calculations, or at least rhetorics, still play a
role. This becomes clear in the Russian concept of the 'near abroad' as well as in a relative
hyperactivity in the former Soviet bloc's rim areas. This became most obvious in the wars of
Yugoslav succession but also applies, if obviously to a lesser extend, to the general political sphere of
the post-World War I cordon-sanitaire nations' descendants, such as the Visegrad countries.
• The new Europe does not face the need of an avoiding strategy any more (avoiding inter-bloc clashes
etc.), but in contrast it becomes necessary to establish enabling conditions, under which
transformation and innovation can be guaranteed.

2. Theoretical Accounts on NATO's Adaptation and Future
2.1 Beyond the Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate: From Metatheory to Practical Relevance
It is to a large extend precisely to try to show the way back to the just mentioned
practical policy engineering that the present study will seek to gain a theoretical
perspective on the question of the system change in Europe and its consequences for the
future role of NATO. The underlying assumption is that what matters for any
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theoretically sound account on NATO's development and future after 1989/90 is to
devise an analytical framework that allows for conceptualizing from a dual perspective
the process of change which the Atlantic Alliance has been undergoing: Firstly, treating
NATO as a self-reliant institution, that is, as NATO, beyond a mere conglomeration of
its member states' interests and policy orientations; yet at the same time, secondly,
heeding that the Alliance is no supranational institution, nor does it exist in a vacuum.
Though shaping an increasingly intrinsic-valued context for political action, it is again embedded in
various other contexts. The foremost analytical consequence is to tie NATO and the process of its
institutional adaptation to the new European politico-security condition back to its constitutive actors,
namely the governments of its member states, whereas at the same time seeing it in the light of the
regional environment. This environment is shaped by the new forms and conditions of Euro-Atlantic
security politics as well as other existing security organizations, forums and initiatives in Europe.
Whereas some five years of scholarly inquiry into NATO's future after defusing bipolarity brought forth a
variety of post-bipolar security philosophies and treatments of the whole spectrum of Euro-Atlantic
security affairs,xi now the issue of Eastern expansion seems to have swept away much of those deepgrounded general interest in NATO's further development. Naturally except of how, how fast, and with
whom the Alliance will enlarge and what might be likely Russian reactions to these steps. However, the
issue of NATO's future and the outlook on a post-bipolar European security order is and will remain by
far more than a question of enlargement. Alike the public and scholarly focus on this one dimension of
NATO's post-bipolar outlook risk to too much divert attention from some other, related or different,
fundamental aspects of NATO's future and institutional adaptation.
Foremost, it is indispensable to treat NATO (and its future) on the grounds of more flexible theoretical
and analytical instruments than the current grand neorealist-neoliberal debatexii with its popular recourse
to stylized propositions about national cooperativity and its stability allows for. Paradoxically enough,
institutional forms themselves, while the original occasion for the controversy, do not play a very
prominent role in the current discussions but are only examined in their effects (as intervening variables)
upon national interest-formation and rational state action: Do states prefer a strong or a loose institutional
framework when choosing to cooperate? Do they prefer institutional arrangements with few or numerous
members? Do they prefer issue-specific or generalized arenas for cooperation?xiii
Thus what the discussion constantly fails to capture is the fact that strictly speaking, the related theoretical
assumptions all focus on state action and that consequently questions relating to intermediary
international-political forms are, if anyway, analytically amenable to them only with severe restrictions.
Yet exactly among those intermediary forms numbers NATO as an international institution - with its
growing corporate identity and at least relative de-coupling from immediate effects of its member states'
short-term calculations in terms of national interest.xiv Nevertheless, much of the neorealist-neoliberal
controversy will still boil down to the celebration of a questionable structuralist approach to international
politics and security - no matter if this seems appropriate to the subject matter in question or not.
For instance, neorealism of the Waltzian style, the predominant core orientation of neorealism's
proponents in the debate with the neoliberals,xv still asserts the uniform reaction of the "units", or nations,
to (always equally perceived) changes in the international-political matrix of power to be the essence of
all international politics and security, as the keeping of each unit's international "position" in relation to
the others is proclaimed to be the ultimate goal.xvi For Waltzian neorealism, or structural realism, the
space between the global international system-structure with its anarchical organizing principle and the
single states, or units, is thus logically empty. Therefore, there can be no forms of institutionalized
regional cooperation but only temporary "amalgamations", which come and go with the respective current
structural shapes of the world-political global constellation.xvii Those do not possess any intrinsic potential
but owe their existence - and, when time has come, their abolishment - to the "most powerful states in the
system", which use them as arenas for settling their power relations.xviii
Consequently, structural realism, as some of its proponents frankly admit, regularly encounters difficulty
when seeking to come to analytical terms with international cooperation that does not take place 'directly'
in the international system and between, and exclusively between, single states but within
institutionalized contexts.xix Neorealist alliance theory has attempted to elucidate that blind spot by
switching over to asserting Waltzian structural effects within those institutionalized contextsxx. Yet it is
far from examining those contexts themselves, merely opening up just another inventory of their possible
effects upon national (cooperative) behavior.
Paradoxically enough, neorealism's neoliberal challenge in its common Keohane-inspired versionxxi
typically exacerbates rather than alleviates these biases. Originally departing from seeking to slacken and
amend Waltz-type neorealist structuralism, it was fast at taking over insights from new institutional
economics into international relations analysis but stopped far short of developing a truly institutional
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approach to international relations. Instead, it continued to search for general world-political effects on
'the' states as such. However, in contrast to neorealism, it no longer assumes them to stem from the
anarchical organization of the international system but from the degree to which international cooperation
is - at least on a regional scale - "institutionalized".xxii For example, guided by common norms, rules,
reciprocal expectations and the structuring effects of international organizations.
These institutionalized forms of international cooperation then, as neoliberalism goes on to argue, help
states to save on transaction costs and to avoid sub-optimal outcomes of cooperation; that is, they defuse
the so-called "political market failure".xxiii All this leads neoliberalism to assume that elements of
institutional certainty will lead even strictly self-interest oriented actors to develop an interest in
maintaining and furthering international cooperative forms.xxiv In the last analysis, neoliberalism broadly
takes over the structuralist methodology of its neorealist counterpart: It examines regular effects of
international 'structures' upon 'the' states (how those structures themselves evolve falls beyond its scope).
Yet in contrast to structural realism, neoliberalism does not spot these structures in the anarchical
organization of the international system but in international "conventions"xxv which states, each following
its own rational self-interest, commonly establish and comply with.
A differentiated typology of the corresponding international institutional forms however does not seem to
be of much interest, as does a closer examination of their qualities, conditions of existence and
development as distinctive international-political phenomena - and not just as products of and arenas for
rationally calculated inter-state cooperation, be it on the ground of incidentally complementary national
self-interests of enlightened, common interests.xxvi Rather, international 'institutions' seem to posses the
bewitching gift to materialize into anything, nevertheless strangely always exerting the same kind of
effects and obeying the same structural logic as outlined above. As analysis may demand, one time
convention-based rule-systems are declared prototypical international institutions,xxvii another time a
specific subset of them, namely international regimes,xxviii and if required, also international organizations
are convertible to institutions, in that they serve as organizing arenas for multilateral cooperationxxix. This
one again underscores that neoliberalism's analytical interest is not in international institutions but in state
action. Institutions only count in their effects on national international behavior,xxx not as genuine entities
in world politicsxxxi.
Puzzling of that kind does not only miss political reality, which even in the security realm does not simply
consist in spot decisions with instantly calculable loss or gain-amounts but in confounded payoffs of
different, intersecting political 'games' and joint acts, that is, "conjunctures"xxxii of at first sight seemingly
independent developments. It also fails to incorporate, or possibly even notice, important theoretical
insights beyond the cooperation-under-anarchy scope. For example, so-called liberal-intergovernmentalist
oriented research has shown that states not only jump forth from one cooperation-bargaining spot to
another but in contrast may use 'historical', existent cooperative arrangements to back their current
bargaining position or to mobilize domestic support.xxxiii

2.2 Theory and Methodology in the Realm of Post-strategic Security
What only seems to have a chance of advancing theory and analysis in the emerging field of poststrategic security is concentrating upon the rapidly growing dynamic and interdependence of different
political problématiques and continuous redefinition of political referential structures.xxxiv In contrast to
strategic security policy as a procedure of deterrence and avoidance, post-strategic security, especially as
regards the East European transitional space, will have to be a procedure of political development. Here at
least, security politics have actually become genuine politics, beyond narrow calculations of military
capabilities, bargaining, or strategies of immediate crisis reaction. The existence, or absence, of a
common political framework will be the critical variable deciding about success and failure of poststrategic security engagement. This importance of politics is in the first place due to the fact that there is
no immediately existential common Euro-transatlantic security interest any more.
This makes it difficult to translate the historically remarkable pan-European and transatlantic international
value-consensus about the predominance of peaceful conflict management into a specific consensus both
about the future organization of common European security and common action in single cases. Here,
calculations in terms of the national interest, as the article will argue, clearly prevail over common values.
In this sense, the condition of post-strategic security newly poses the classical question of alliance
cohesion. That is especially important for the future of the Atlantic Alliance: Decisive becomes the allies'
ability to agree upon general political guidelines and devise according genuinely common, and not just
incidentally complementary, interests.
The crucial theoretical and political puzzle then is the steady self-positioning of the actors in the face of
security trends and risks. This brings functions of theory on the foreground that lie beyond the scope of
the neorealist-neoliberal controversy: not ex-post explanation, but policy-escorting and projecting

9
construction of scenarios. In contemporary international relations theory, especially the so-called
Copenhagen schoolxxxv devotes itself to the related analytical tasks - together with proponents of a
modified structural realismxxxvi, which focuses on processes of regional political configuration that may
vary from one issue to another, thus foreclosing any chance to be conceived of in structural terms of
sustainable cooperation or iterated games.
In this sense, it suggests itself to refrain from reasoning about the mere condition of international or
regional security, directing attention to the process of "securization"xxxvii. That means trying to construct
confluents of the various political trends and attempts to build a European security condition - beyond the
illusion of a rational-functionalist security constructivism that both the neorealist and the neoliberal
mainstream share to a large extend. Quite different from the point of departure that Hellmann and Wolf
chose for their seminal study,xxxviii NATO's future under the post-strategic European security condition
seems less amenable to a structural-systemic type of analysis (as they see it exemplified by neorealism
and neoliberalism) but to a multi-level approach which seeks to combine different levels of analysis, from
the international system over institutionalized forms of cooperation and the national factor down to
individual actors, in the light of an overarching synoptic perspective.
Especially the emerging paradigms of critical social theoryxxxix and critical security studiesxl have
attempted to overcome the structuralist and monocausal bias that much of the neorealist-neoliberal
controversy exhibits. They underscore the socially constructed, contextual - as opposed to merely
structural - character of international relations, interactions and issue areas, such as security or alliance
politics. Consequently, its proponents now and again engage in the debates over 'institutions' in
international relations as sparked off by the general neorealist-neoliberal controversy.xli However, critical
social theory does not open a viable path to overcoming the mentioned shortcomings in conceptualizing
NATO's institutional adaptation. While making a big step toward appreciating factors such a context
dependency of political action and institutional forms, the institutions themselves still as always remain
epiphenomenal. Though progressively understood as constitutive conditions for national interests,
national identities and state action, they even here are not appreciated as political phenomena of an own
kind and worth of being studied as such.xlii
Organizational theory, too, although recently applied to the case of NATO's persistence and evolution
after the Cold War in a manner that a first sight appears plausible and fruitful,xliii provides no viable
alternative. At a glance, it seems all-obvious that NATO should be a predestined object for organizational
analysis, for it is not only a 'simple' international alliance but supplanted by important organizational
characteristics. As Inis Claude observed,

In organizational terms, NATO is something new under the international
sun. It is an alliance which involves the construction of institutional
mechanisms, the development of multilateral procedures, and the
elaboration of preparatory plans for the conduct of joint military action in
future contingencies. It substitutes for the mere promise of improvised
collaboration in the event of crisis the ... actuality of planned collaboration
in anticipation of a military challenge to its members. It is a coalition
consisting not merely in a treaty on file, but also of an organization in being
- a Secretary-General and permanent staff, a Council, a network of
committees, a military command structure, study groups, and liaison
agencies."xliv
Yet much as it is undeniable that NATO possesses and further develops important traits
of corporate identity which resemble organizational features, these are not quite
amenable to organizational theory. 'Organizations' in its sense are characterized by welldefined membership, fixed membership figures, durably marked boundaries, internal
role and status differentiation, hierarchy in authority and by behavior paths shaped by
the organizational structure and imposed on the members. With its various institutional
out- and sub-buildings such as PfP, NACC and the concept of Combined Joint Task
Force headquarters (CJTF HQ), the new NATO has no clear-cut membership structure
and outer boundary, but both are subject to change from case to case, according to the
activated context. Consequently, there neither are fixed general behavior paths, nor can
one speak of an organizationally warranted hierarchy in status and authority.
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2.3 A New Institutionalist Approach
Given all those theoretical complications, the question arises how, or if anyway, international relations
scholars can hope to come to terms with the conditions and process of NATO's adaptation. The answer
suggested here is: It is indeed an institutionalist approach that seems most promising - as long as it relies
on concepts and methods that stem from general social science institutionalismxlv and go well beyond the
neorealist-neoliberal debate about international cooperation and institutions.
Institutionalism in this sense mainly comes as a methodology, not as a set of propositions or another new
theory of international relations. It pleads for a "methodological turn"xlvi in service of better analytical
adequacy, not so much for a whole theoretical turn. As for the case of NATO, what makes it promising is
that it offers a frame of reference allowing for arranging some promising assumptions of neorealism,
neoliberalism and critical social theory together and linking them with insights gained by general
institutionalist thought in the social sciences. Moreover, an institutionalist frame of reference facilitates
multi-level analysis. Far from conceiving of institutions in neoliberal substantialist fashion as mere
intermediate structural factors or intervening variables mitigating between the effects of international
anarchy on state action and international cooperation, it sees them embedded in - if not constituted by various intersecting contextsxlvii (in our case such as national, international, regional or concurring
institutional), which may shift over time and from one situation to another, exerting variable effects.
Admittedly, also in general social science institutionalism, a gripping characterization or even handy
definition of 'the' institutional approach or 'the' institutionalism as well as of the very concept of
'institution' is yet to be achieved. Nevertheless, over the years a useful inventory of institutionalist
methodology and core assumptions has emerged. Following on from it, for the purposes followed here
with respect to an institutional account on the Atlantic Alliance, three typically institutionalist
assumptions can be highlighted:xlviii path-dependency, discontinuity and multiple causation.
(1) Political developments are path-dependent -xlix not only in the sense of the tendency of once taken
courses to persevere but in the first place in the sense of the dependence of current decisions on past.
Consequently, not only (national) political action (as for example critical social theory assumesl) but also
institutional developments themselves follow the principle of context-dependency. Institutions not only
form contexts for state action but are again embedded in larger contexts, which in turn influence the
conditions of the institutions' existence and development.li
(2) Given this multiple codeterminancy, political change as well as political action under institutional
conditions in general consequently proceeds discontinuously and episodically.lii Taken paths of
development are constantly co-influenced by contingencies and the need to react to new trends on a shortterm basis. Additionally, individual or spot acts (as for example undertaken by single governments or
officials) - whether intended or not - may exert effects on collective institutional forms. In this sense,
interestingly to notice, already in 1979 Waltz had proclaimed the principle of the "tyranny of small
decisions", which under certain contextual conditions can cause inconspicuous "'small' decisions" to
trigger vigorous "'large' change".liii Hence, it becomes dubious to call for a new, rational-intentional grand
design of the future of NATO or even the whole spectrum of European and transatlantic security policy.liv
(3) The only rule political developments really seem to regularly obey to, then, is the one of complex
multiple causation. This results already from the fact that not only present problem areas but also the
respective institutional history influence them.lv For example historical ideas, which despite changed
conditions cannot be abolished - already for reasons of continued self-legitimization. As for NATO, this
becomes most obvious in the continued emphasis of the principle of collective defense (despite the
unquestioned missing of any clearly identifiable and 'personalizable' enemy, which this concept usually
requires).
The subsequent institutional account on NATO will look into the three main dimensions of NATO's
institutional context already alluded to, which also form the chief determinants of its future development,
as well as the future shape of European and transatlantic security policy. One obvious context is, of
course, the European regional system itself, that is to say, NATO's immediate operational context as well
as other institutional forms such as WEU or OSCE. Most analyses stop at that point and do not delve any
deeper in the two remaining decisive contexts of Alliance politics: the international-political system (as
the global context of the Euro-regional political space) and the national dimension (as the constitutive and
supplanting context of the Euro-regional political space and determining factor for what kind of actual
transatlantic security engagement, or disengagement, as the case may be, one can expect to develop in a
medium-term perspective).

The global reference of European security and Alliance politics refers to the
respective constitutive context and helps to localize the regional European dimension
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within the global international system with its fundamental organizing principles as they
also apply to any regional setting. The regional dimension is, of course, the specific
sphere of developments, challenges and problems that NATO has been facing since the
end of the Cold War and that the present study seeks to conceptualize and explain with a
view to evaluating and 'refining' related theoretical statements and political guidelines.
To delve into the national dimension of NATO's future role is especially important when
seeking to portray an image of likely forms of future transatlantic security engagement,
also as far as conflict intervention and the use of force are concerned.

3. The Global Dimension of NATO's Relevance, Role and Future
3.1 Theoretical Interpretations of the Causes and Effects of the End of the Cold War
Examining the global dimension of the system change in Europe is not only necessary
in order to systematically locate the case in point here, that is, NATO's situation and
future, within its broader institutional context, namely the international-political system
but also to answer a decisive analytical question: What, after all, is the distinctive
character of that post-bipolarized international-political system as compared to the Cold
War-setting? Coming to terms with this question, although seemingly at least not
directly pertaining to the question of NATO's current outlook and future roles, is of
prime importance to identify the conditions of departure that any post-Cold War
European security order is to face. It relates to general characteristics of international
politics and security that also leave their imprint on the European regional system and
its actors, be they nation states or international institutions in a broader sense (see the
attached table to illustrate the following).
Given the theoretical diversity of the field, it comes as no surprise that there is a whole spectrum of
controversial answers, depending on which paradigm one chooses as a frame of reference.lvi Now as
before, the clearest marks are the (neo)realistlvii and the neoliberal view, sometimes also termed
Hobbesian and Grotian.lviii
(Neo)realism with its principally Hobbesian view of political relations as defined in terms of and largely
determined by alignments and the distribution of power identifies the chief cause of the Cold War in the
trivial effect of super power competition, exacerbated by uncertainty about the opponent's next move's
and resulting tendency for misperceptions to emerge.lix Against such a background, the structure of the
bipolar order appears as built up by the quest for power and security and tensed by the ever-present
security dilemma. Causes of the long peace, then, were the stable bipolarized distribution of power and
the obviously functioning system of military deterrence. (Neo)realism sees the current era marked by a
transition to multipolarity, ending the Cold War, or bipolarity, but not really the East-West conflict. It
regards long-standing basic axioms such as international anarchy and the security dilemma, if in a
qualitatively changed mode, still as typical of international relations. In sum, on the grounds of
(neo)realist thinking, one should expect neo-nationalism and all-European instability to rise if no tectonic
countermeasures are taken. Respective proposed policy guidelines center around the setup of new
balance-of-power politics, if necessary relying on multilateral interventionism. (Neo)realists would
therefore recommend NATO to follow a modus operandi of strategic response to the developments in
Middle and Eastern Europe.
Drawing from Grotian trains of thought, neoliberalism sees the extension and contents of (broadly
defined) international institutions as decisive factors for international cooperation, peace and stability.lx It
attributes the causes of the Cold War mainly to an insufficient institutionalization of the anti-Hitler
coalition after 1945 so that the following Cold-War period emerged, which suffered from a multiplicity of
uncanalized conflicts. Still, increasing regulation of conflict by common mechanisms and collective
learning from crises made the Cold War stay cold. The current era is characterized by the spread of
enlightened national interests: After the fall of the iron curtain, opportunities for interstate interaction
have tremendously increased. According to its axiom that the behavior strategies and interest of states
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tend to adapt to one another the more often that states interact in comparable situations (law of
reciprocity), neorealism expects a trend towards long-term oriented cooperation.
The appropriate denominator, then, is no the 'end of the Cold War' or the 'end of the East-West conflict'
but a coming period of sustainable conflict transformation and institutionalization of cooperation.
Appropriate policy strategies, in this view, would be a general transfer of stability to the East, building
issue-linkages between different political problems and agendas so to trigger spill-overs of cooperative
norms and procedures from one issue area to another. Notably however, such an approach needs to follow
NATO's institutional expansion with skepticism, due to lacking political rule-knowledge in the new
member states, which may endanger the so far reached level of cooperation and ameliorative
transformation of conflict among the 'old' NATO members.

Apart from the (neo)realist (or Hobbesian) and neoliberal (or Grotian) viewpoint, at
least three other paradigms are of importance here, which equally challenge the
Hobbesian and the Grotian one. These are the global governance (or Kantian) school,
the normative theory of internationalism (or Lockeian school) and the paradigm of
critical theory (or, if one will, Neo-Marxian school) already referred to earlier.
The global governance schoollxi departs from Kantian thinking insofar as it takes the internal organization
of the interacting nation states as chief factor determining the war- and peace-proneness of the
international system. It sees democratic states constrained in their conflict behavior and driven to peaceful
interaction by two factors: first their pluralist domestic infrastructure which makes it more difficult to
mobilize military capabilities and pursue an aggressive foreign polity; second the allegedly increasing
orientation of democratic governments towards international democratic norms and peaceful regulation of
dispute.lxii Elaborating on the latter, it chiefly are reciprocal, typified positive perceptions that Kantians
expect to further decrease the chance of escalating conflict between (Western type) democracies. It sees
the prime factor leading up to the split of the post-World War II great power concert as it was established
by the Potsdam conference in competing value-laden concepts of political order (Western democracy vs.
Soviet-type Volksdemokratie).
Still, in its view, the long peace during the Cold War was secured by de facto ideological moderation on
both sides. With the Soviet empire's demise, Kantians see the core conflict over the respective different
conceptions of political and global order resolved. Thus for them, the current era is marked by the end of
the whole (culturally defined) East-West conflict, not just its politico-military superstructure, namely
bipolarization, antagonistic alliance systems and inter-bloc confrontation. Following on from this,
proponents of the global governance school now expect a peaceful world of liberal democracies to
evolve, rendering the full realization of the world-political project of democracy the first point of
reference for post-Cold War policy. It is to be accomplished by enlarging Western institutions, with
NATO making one important, but no paramount, contribution to a crescent sphere of positive perceptions
and effective international democratic norms.
Normative theory, or internationalism,lxiii starts from what could be called a Locke-inspired point of view:
It sees the degree of centralization and effectiveness of norms (of course, in contrast to Locke, not at the
national but at the international level) as the decisive factor for peace and stability. The Cold War, then,
resulted from an insufficient coercive effect of international norms and missing strong world interests
overarching the two emerging blocks. The structure of the bipolar order, consequently, was made up and
maintained by a dispersion and depreciation of international norms and common interests. Whereas
internationalists make no statement about why the Cold War then stayed cold, they now identify a trend
towards a world public and derive from the thus greatly increased observability of national international
behavior a tendency to increased norm-compliance and collaborative orientation. This could lead to a
principled world policy, a kind of "global constitutionalism" which then would replace the anarchical
order of power as underscored by (neo)realists as the dominant organizing principle in international
affairs.lxiv
Internationalism in consequence expects effective international norm building under the global aegis of
the United Nations. Proposed policy guidelines are intensifying the buildup and adherence to a common
body of international norms, collective sanction politics against deviant states and reforming NATO to a
part of the envisaged global system of U.N.-sanction politics, that is, in the final analysis, rendering it a
sub-contractor of the U.N.
Critical theory, which could be labeled neo-Marxian,lxv sees international peace and stability as always
superimposed by the dominant powers as long as no socially just international political community is
established. The prime factor responsible for this superimposed peace and stability is hegemonic ability to
define the world-political situation. It this view, the Cold War resulted simply from the then perfectly
given conditions for great power politics, which were mainly due to a low degree of politicization of the
world public. The structure of the bipolar order, then, was little more than an imposed construction by the
superpowers so to keep virtually all other nations out of their 'game', but in as allies.
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The Cold War then, mainly in contrast to realist interpretations, it not seen as a structural effect triggered
by the anarchical organization of the international system and bipolarized world-political competition but
as a "fight for loyalties".lxvi Like internationalism, critical theory makes no distinctive statements about
the causes of the long Cold-War peace but is very decisive when answering the question of how the
current post-bipolar era is best characterized: As an erosion of the repressive traditional ‘texts’of power
and a lack of new legitimatory tales, amounting to a deconstruction of the overdrawn contrasts stemming
from the era of East-West confrontation. What critical theory expects for the future is a wave of global
social change that will sweep away the tenacious rests of the old, bipolar world-political text. This results
in radical policy guidelines, aiming at the dissolution of both the U.N. and NATO and subscribing itself
to the emancipatory endeavor of realizing global social security.
Insert table about here !

3.2 For an Existential Realist Viewpoint
Which of these models can now serve as a sensible foundation from which to precede
when, as the global context of the European setting and NATO's future role, seeking to
grasp the distinctive character of the post-Cold War world with a special view to
security politics and conflict management?
On a world-wide scale, the regional conflicts broken out after 1989/90 show that the end of the Cold War,
in terms of security politics and conflict management, meant little more than the dissolution of the
bipolarized world-political structure. Various conflict data support the realist bon mot that with bipolarity,
global threat and the resulting danger of world-scale conflict disappearing and offensive capacities
slashed, the world in fact has become rather more insecure than 'civilized' and stable.lxvii For example,
form 1989 to 1992 the total number of worldwide registered armed conflicts increased from 46-47 to 5455, subsequently going back to no less than 46 in 1993 and 42 in 1994. Moreover, in 1990 as much armed
conflicts were started as for the last time in 1963.
Dividing the numbers of armed conflicts registered in post-Cold War Europe in a late-Soviet Union
period (1989-1991) and an early post-Soviet Union period (1992-94), we find 8 such conflicts in the first
and 14, almost twice as much, in the second. So even if on a world-wide scale the total number of armed
conflicts seems to have peaked in 1992 and now to be declining, it would be rash to allege a general trend
of abating violent conflict. Including low intensity conflicts (defined as armed conflict with less than
1000 battle-related deaths per year), the period 1989-94 saw a total of 94 violent conflicts in 64 different
locations. Thus there is little evidence for alleging a progressive civilization of conflict, as global
governance and neoliberalism do. Such a tendency, moreover, would have to be a bottom-up phenomenon
(cf. the neoliberal law of reciprocity in reiterated interaction in similar settings). Yet it is precisely
smaller, low-level conflicts that have not decreased, as one should then expect, but remarkably increased
in the aftermath of the Cold War. In the year 1989, we witnessed 13-14, in 1992 22-23, in 1993 15 and in
1994 17 of such conflicts. Intermediate conflicts (in statistical terms more than 1000 battle-related deaths
in total and between 25 and 1000 in that particular year) increased from 14 in 1989 to 18 in 1994.
This empirical data thus suggest a continued appropriateness of (neo)realist thought in the realm of
international security and conflict. An important other argument in favor of (neo)realism is that, at a
closer look, the end of the Cold War has changed or erased far less of the fundamental principles of
international politics as they especially apply to the field of security politics than it is frequently argued.
It is now clear that with the breakdown of Soviet communism, manifesting itself in the dissolution of the
Warsaw Treaty Organization in April and the Soviet Union itself in December 1991, bipolarity, or the
Cold War, came to and end but not really the East-West conflict itself.lxviii This conflict is more
ideologically than geographically defined, and the Gulf War of 1991 as well as the war on the postYugoslav territory underscored the endurance of the related incompatibilities. Quite different from the
'deconstructivist' commonsense endeavors in contemporary international theorizing as well as growing
political hopes of a continued transformation of conflict and a crescent culture of democratic peace in
Europe, political realism - in theory and practice alike - is far from being anachronistic and obsolete. As
for the realm of international security, for instance, political realism is also far from being a mere
rationalized apology of power politics. In contrast, with its classical emphasis on systematic historical
comparison and inductive heuristicslxix it not only offers an overarching theoretical perspective on the
long-standing organizational characteristics of world politics, the most important of which have remained
unchanged beyond the end of the Cold War, but also provides a useful set of rules of thumb for
conceptualizing politics on a more lasting basis than the one of short-sighted beliefs and hopes.
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For such a purpose, what has come to be called "existential realism"lxx offers itself as an overarching
starting point. This existential realism purports a pragmatic consensus about those realities of
international politics that are simply given (or existent) and to be commonly recognized if one seeks
international politics and security as well as scientific and political reasoning about it to consist in more
than longing to ad-hoc decisions and value-laden exhibition bouts over 'good' ultimate goals.lxxi
Existential realism underscores that three axioms of the international systems are still valid: firstly its
anarchical structure and thus the lack of any central authority empowered to act independent of and if
necessary against the prevalence of national self-interest, secondly the consequent tendency to resort to
the principle of self-help and thirdly the security dilemma.lxxii Whereas commonsense reasoning nowadays
will typically deny the continued political relevance of the security dilemma-condition, newer trains of
conceptual research have shown that it not only still has its traditional significance but - after the vanish
of the bipolar structural overlay - also extends to whole new dimensions.
For example, in the field of ethno-national conflict studies the concept of "emerging anarchy"lxxiii has
been put forward to catch the effects of unexpected desegregation of different ethnic groups, which
usually triggers primordial revival. To grasp this new quality of the classical security dilemma, consider
the following: The 'new' security dilemma will become virulent and directive for political action,
regardless of on which level of political aggregation (from ethno-national up to global), whenever a
hegemonic or predominant global or all-regional political order collapses rather abruptly. What is
important for the security dilemma to take effect, then, is obviously not the condition of international
anarchic per se, but the special state of emerging anarchy: Neighboring groups (from ethnies to whole
nations) become suddenly conscious (or their political leadership successfully attempts to suggest them)
that from now on, they have to provide for their security themselves.lxxiv Such a conception of anarchy
also matches well with the onset of the Cold War, when the common phalanx against the Axis came to an
end, also ending the globally structuring element of the war-time alliance. Quite different from
widespread idealistic hopes and transfigurations, thus, the security dilemma did not disappear together
with to end of bipolarity.
Accepting the empirical and theoretical outset presented here, it follows the insight that with the end of
the Cold War various things may have ended, albeit the global danger of violent conflict. Anything may
have broken out but perpetual peace - not even in Europe. To make things worse, one will have to say that
especially in the post-bipolar world, violent forms of conflict are on the best way to gain a permanent
position in world politics. Above all, these are ethno-nationally based tensions and crises. It literally
seems as if the collective ideologization of world politics during the cold war now were to be superseded
by a regionally, nationally and subnationally virulent thrust of ideology. The corresponding cleavages
often run straight through societies. This makes it difficult to redefine them, or at least to protect them
from violent clashing, by military means. In these situations, even mere blue-helmet tasks, such as the
mid-term separation of the disputing parties, seem to be increasingly unfeasible.lxxv
For existential realism, despite, the question of value-based yardsticks for foreign and international
security policy is all but obsolete. Yet it acknowledges that every, including its own, theoretical
orientation, just as every political conviction however honest it may be, necessarily represents more or
less narrowly confined, partial perspectives on the vast variety of political affairs. Following on from this,
existential realism consciously and strictly refrains from high-handedly recommending normative
concepts for immediate political realization. Rather, it asks for the practical preconditions both of the
development and sustainable implementation of those prescriptive recommendations.

3.3 New World Order - The U.N. vs. NATO?
Whereas in the immediate aftermath of the breakdown of the bipolarized Cold War
order, the United Nations were often seen as a resurgent Utopia of global-scale security
politics, replacing regionalism and alliances. Yet soon not only the Gulf War but also the
War of Yugoslav succession made clear that this Utopia soon went lost - to a security
multilateralism whose global formative influence will in the first place be determined by
national capabilities and interests.lxxvi It by now has become evident that no system of
collective security within the U.N. framework will render regional security alignments
and institutional structures obsolete or at least reunite them under the global umbrella of
the U.N. Rather, as not only the Gulf war of 1991 but also the cases of Somalia and
Bosnia have shown most clearly, any effective U.N. security engagement involving the
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use of military force will have to resort to the logistic and operational assets of either the
U.S. or a particular regional security organization that has sometimes been so
vigorously reprimanded for now standing and acting in obsolescence - and this is the
Atlantic Alliance.
The Alliance not only unites the nations whose participation in international peace operations has often
enough proved crucial for its success. It also is the only working security system in the contemporary
world. In a few aspects, its record may appear to some as ambivalent, for it could not prevent a war and
recurrent conflict between two of its members, Greece and Turkey, and has had some difficulty in
positioning itself in the new post-Cold War setting of European international institutions, involving a
sometimes confusing change in its self-ascribed 'new' functions (reaching, for example, from an out-ofarea operation agency over a regional stability-projector to and U.N. sanction-implementation service).
Yet it has indisputably reached an outstanding level of representing, in the sense of Karl Deutsch, a
"security community": It disposes of a common military doctrine, permanent headquarters with
international staff, multinationally integrated forces, a common supreme commander for the Atlantic area
(SACLANT) and the European area (SACEUR), has always conducted multinational force training and
maneuvers, and has - what makes it even more unique in the world - effective common command and
control arrangement, communications capacities and capacities for transport and force-projection.
Considering the related national investments that were necessary to set up and maintain this security
community, it is only logical that the Alliance, vice its official bodies, did everything to counter the view
that the U.N. was to become the prime international security organization under the aegis of which
NATO, at best, could play a sometime-complementary role and that decisions about common action
within the Alliance must never be taken within the U.N.lxxvii
NATO codified its strategic relationship to the U.N. in two documents, MC 327, entitled "NATO Military
Planning for Peace Support Operations" of 5 August 1993 and "NATO Doctrine for Peace Support
Operations" of 28 February 1994. MC 327 is a NATO military decision taken by the military
representatives of the fifteen states which form the NATO military committee. French resistance has
prevented it from being agreed by the North Atlantic Council of the sixteen Foreign Ministers of the
Alliance but it is used within the integrated military structure. In MC 327, NATO declares itself in
principle prepared to cooperate with the U.N. but underscores that NATO decisions will remain NATO
decisions and no command and control authorities shall be transferred to the U.N. Most importantly, as a
study summarizes MC 327, "national participation in peace support operations will remain subject to
national decision" and the Alliance intends to use "its existing command structure ... to the greatest extend
possible, with the details "to be determined on a "case by case basis".lxxviii
MC 327 does not specify any responsibility to report to the U.N. on the part of NATO force commanders,
the North Atlantic Council or the Defense Planning Committee. The commander of a NATO-supported
U.N. force will "normally be an Alliance flag or general officer, serving in an appropriate position in the
integrated military structure."lxxix This principle has already become practice in the operation Sharp
Guard, that is the surveillance of the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro on the Adriatic and the
IFOR and SFOR mission in Bosnia. In the latter two cases, a prediction made in a 1994 study has proven
remarkably matching the political reality of 1996 and 1997:

"NATO military thinking about the command and control relationship with
the U.N. is likely to move in the direction of following the new U.S. peace
operations policy. For traditional blue helmet peacekeeping operations
NATO could accept U.N.-developed mandates and command and control
relationships. These could be implemented by the NATO nations in
cooperation with the Partnership for Peace countries. At the same time,
increasingly restrictive policies could be implemented for mandates and
command and control in operations likely to include combat missions or
peace enforcement operations. Major military interventions of the Gulf Wartype might be conducted by NATO or U.S.-led ad hoc coalitions, based on
weak and flexible Security Council resolutions. U.N. guidance would be
limited to acceptable levels, guaranteeing NATO political and military
freedom of movement."lxxx
The Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 of 4 May 1994, entitled "The Clinton
Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations", well exemplifies
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this trend in U.S. national strategy definition as far as multilateral action is concerned.
At the same time however, PDD 25 underlines some important regulations and
restrictions that apply to U.S. support for U.N. peace operations:
"In improving our capabilities for peace operations, we will not discard or
weaken other tools for U.S. objectives. If U.S. participation in a peace
operation were to interfere with our basic military strategy, winning two
major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously (as established in the Bottom
Up Review), we would place our national interests uppermost. ...
Multilateral peace operations must, therefore, be placed in proper
perspective among the instruments of U.S. foreign policy.
The U.S. does not support a standing UN army, nor will we earmark specific
U.S. military units for participation in UN operations. ...
It is not U.S. policy to seek to expand either the number of UN peace
operations or U.S. involvement in such operations. ... Instead, this policy ...
aims to ensure that our use of peacekeeping is selective and more effective.
...
The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over
U.S. forces. On a case by case basis, the President will consider placing
appropriate U.S. forces under the operational control of a competent UN
commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council.
The greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will
agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over
U.S. forces. Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace
enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be
conducted under U.S. command and control or through competent regional
organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions."lxxxi
Other nations' 'peacekeeping doctrines' make similar statements. In Great Britain, for
example, it is an almost rhetorical question to ask what reasons there could be to take on
any global responsibility within the U.N. framework but to secure one's own vital
national interests.lxxxii As will be seen below, Great Britain, like other countries such as
France with its grande-nation tradition or Germany with its civilian-power tradition, has
only just started to take the step "from defence to security" - that is, defining its defense
and traditional 'security' policy, also as far as military engagement in the service for
peace is concerned, beyond a mere national towards a genuinely international focus.lxxxiii
Most obviously and remarkably in France, public understanding of the fact that defense
and security, already due to important shortcomings in national defense capabilities such
as short term force deployability becoming obvious during the Gulf War of 1991, no
longer can be a national affair, but that in fact it can no longer be conceived of without
international integration.lxxxiv
Despite the political rhetorics and moral hopes of an uprising new era of collective security with the U.N.
setting, the fact has been a trend towards rather seeking regional organizations as frameworks for
multilateral peace operations. Here history seems to repeat itself, for this post-Cold War tendency of
uniting against 'new', if diffuse, 'aggressions' and 'threats' and the at first unexpected prominent role of the
Atlantic Alliance in those mattes that at first were widely deemed to do rather the last bit to make NATO
as essentially a collective defense organization obsolete exactly parallels the setting of the upcoming Cold
War when the hopes pinned on the just founded U.N. were already rendered unrealistic. As Inis Claude so
astutely observed, then
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"[t]he first reaction of the Western powers to the realization that they needed
an arrangement for collective defense against the threat of Soviet aggression
was not to reverse the San Francisco decision against relying upon
collective security for this kind of job, but to create an extra-United Nations
system - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."lxxxv
3.4 Global Factors Switching the Points for the European Security Problématique
To sum up, it is indispensable to appreciate the global context, or paradoxically
speaking the global dimension of regional security and security politics in Europe,
before turning to analyzing the Euro-regional system itself. In the course of this,
important preconditions for an appropriate examination of the future role of NATO can
be clarified. The following points deserve special notice:
• Of the competing interpretations about the end of the Cold War and the related
expectations about the future, the (neo)realist point of view has proven to be most
adequate, at least as for security politics and the future of its institutional structures,
as well as the (re)crescent relevance of national interests and emerging new forms of
the security dilemma.
• Assuming an increasing (Euro-)regional relevance of the U.N. and its specific
mechanisms for managing conflicts is as unrealistic as expecting a globalization of
NATO's regional approach and its related mechanisms. Not only national interests of
the respective member states run counter but also missing resources and military
capabilities, such as short-term deployability and long-distance projection.
• According to the proposed underlying institutionalist methodology, it can be
concluded that already the global constitutive context of the Euro-regional security
problématique brings about a high degree in path-dependency, discontinuity and
multicausality in institutional developments. Ideally, institutional change should
naturally follow the political problems and trends. Nevertheless, a continuous
adaptation is improbable, and often enough it appears as if the problems and
developments rather follow the institutions. An example is the case of exYugoslavia, where the conflicts now have gone through virtually all institutional
steps of security politics and conflict management: from individualist approaches
such as mediatory groups and plans (for example the London Contact Group and the
Vance-Owen draft) over the U.N. peacekeeping debacle of the UNPROFOR
mission, reprisals taken under cooperation of WEU, OSCE and NATO (for example
the control of shipping in the Adriatic and on the Danube in order to enforce the
embargo against Serbia and Montenegro) to the conference approach of Dayton and
the U.N.-NATO co-action in order to implement it (that is, the IFOR and SFOR
mission).
• Relating to the foregoing point, seemingly so concrete military cooperation, in the
post-strategic security realm, is not only about operativity and crisis responsiveness
but about politics, too. Military arrangements also have an important political
meaning and in part foremost fulfill political, rather than military-operational,
functions. Conversely, politically motivated cooperation programs can adopt, and
form the core of, military operativity (such as the PfP program, which largely
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contributed to set up the channels of command and control for the IFOR and SFOR
missions, conducted by NATO and non-NATO nations).
Finally, this section intended to clarify the overall constitutive effects of the global
context of Euro-regional security on NATO's future role and the related general
determinants. At the same time, however, the overview of the different interpretations of
the meaning of the changed world-political setting after the Cold War and the derived
alleged consequences for NATO clearly showed the difficulty in determining the future
of the Alliance and recommendable policy strategies just by recurring to models of
global trends and 'pressure'. Here, useful as it has proven in the preceding part of the
analysis, a clear caveat against (neo)realism and its predominant structural bias is in
order.

4. The Regional Dimension - NATO's Institutional Adaptation
Now that some important dimensions of the global-international context of NATO's
future have been explicated, analysis can precede to the immediate context of its
institutional adaptation and future, that is, the Euro-regional setting.
4.1 NATO's Institutional Potential and Adaptation: A Multi-Level Process
The Alliance's unexpected specific potential for continued legitimization and even
increased institutional attractiveness precisely after the vanish of a conspicuous
common threat is obviously exemplified not only by the enlargement project but also by
France's new behavior of approach and integration. Its clearest marks are the return into
NATO's Military Committee in December 1995 and its considering a full return into the
Alliance's integrated military structure as announced during the Berlin Ministerial
Meeting of June 1996. That was the final piece of evidence needed to flaw the
Mearsheimerian, strict-(neo)realist scenario of a dissolution of NATO and a related
relapse into an unstable and conflict-laden European concert of renationalized foreign
and defense policieslxxxvi.
This shows at least that the Alliance's general political and military-operational goal setting has been
flexible enough to secure the maintenance of its integration until far beyond the turning point of 1989/90.
What appears to be the critical point for NATO's future is less saving its mere existence as such or
amending it by the adoption of new members than the question of its prospective character as a EuroAtlantic security institution with the related informal rules, expectations, common interests, routinized
political and military-operational procedures and a world-public image.lxxxvii This leads to the general
proposition that sharply defined common (military) threat fading, alliances tend to show the appearance
and problems typical of a security community.lxxxviii Then the question of internal, mainly genuinely
political mechanisms for both continued intra-Alliance cooperation and external effectiveness becomes
decisive.lxxxix
Yet such a point of view is no analytical patent remedy either. For example, the currently so popular
thesis that international institutions condition national adaptive behavior and the shape of common
interestsxc tempts one - as argued above - to overlook the question how these institutions themselves adapt
to changed international-political conditions, or if they are capable of such an adaptation anywayxci. In
this context, it can be shown that the ease of the bipolar overlay exposed NATO to classical internationalpolitical adaptive pressure in the structural-realist, Waltzian sense, meaning that changes in the
international-political "structure" "shove" NATO as such towards certain courses of action so to maintain
its 'position' in the international system.xcii Nevertheless, structural realism à la Waltz is not quite
applicable to that phenomenon. Its "units" are states, making international organizations and institutional
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forms fall out of its analytical scope. Nevertheless, a structural-realist based model for NATO's
institutional adaptation since 1990 is quite elucidating.
According to such a model of adaptive pressure, NATO's "London Declaration" of July 1990 stated that
"this Alliance must and will adapt."xciii The approach was, whereas retaining the primacy of collective
self-defense, to sincerely review and revise the formulation of this common defense, so that

"the Alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy will change
fundamentally to include the following elements:
- NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will
be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum
flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on
multinational corps made up of national units.
- NATO will scale back the readiness for its active units, reducing training
requirements and the number of exercises.
- NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and
when they might be needed."xciv
This identified imperative of adaptation found its concrete political and military
consequence in "The Alliance's new Strategic Concept" as agreed upon during the
Rome Summit of November 1991. Accordingly (amending, not replacing, its traditional
political and military functions), three new roles for NATO were envisaged: the
"dialogue with other nations", an "active search for a cooperative approach to European
security" and complementing as well as reinforcing "political actions within a broad
approach to security", thereby contributing with the "Alliance's military forces" to the
management of such crises and theirs peaceful resolution" that "might lead to a military
threat to the security of Alliance members".xcv One further component of this plan for
institutional adaptation was to establish a concrete "diplomatic liaison"xcvi with the
former Warsaw Pact countries, which subsequently found its institutional formation in
the set-up of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in December 1991 and the
Partnership for Peace program in January 1994.
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, NATO moreover consciously turned
to a 'generalized' enemy. Correspondingly, the new Strategic Concept stated:

"In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied
security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which
makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of
responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance
members are to be preserved. These risks can arise in various ways."xcvii
That way, the Strategic Concept precisely did not give up the traditional core functions
of the Alliance but reaffirmed them - whereas at the same time acknowledging the need
for far-reaching institutional changes exactly because of the continuance of its principle
rationale.
Here one particular paradox in NATO's institutional adaptation to the changed, post-Cold War setting
becomes obvious, which makes it clear that any meaningfully institutional perspective on contemporary
Euro-Atlantic security must at least combine neorealist and neoliberal assumptions, instead of either
trying to play them off against each other. The paradox could be termed the structural-functional
paradox, which has shown up in NATO's development since 1990: Neoliberalism predicted NATO's
continued existence as such, yet if only in the pure sense of self-resistance against dissolution and with
recourse to sweeping axioms like the alleged striving of states for keeping the transaction costs involved
in international cooperation low.xcviii What neoliberalism did not predict were qualitative institutional
changes. Rather, according to its assumption of trivial institutional stickiness over changed settings and
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faded initial founding interests,xcix it had to expect a functional reorientation of NATO under retention of
its structure - which Keohane explicitly predictedc. What NATO however has shown and still shows at
the moment is, contrarily, a structural reorientation under retention of its essential founding function
(that is providing for common defense and concentrating on military concerns). As the Strategic Concept
continued:

"Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context.
The first is that the new environment does not change the purpose or the
security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring
validity. The second, on the other hand, is that the changed environment
offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad
approach to security. ... NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington
Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom
and security of all its members by political and military means in
accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on
common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the
Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and
lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains
unchanged."ci
However, the new Strategic Concept of Rome did not mark but a fairly common
agreement on NATO's future and the imminent necessities of organizational and
operational change. One manifest statement was that it would be all about a
fundamental, also organizational, adaptation to new political and military challenges
while preserving the primacy of collective defense. Yet even this consensus was in large
part a product of the member states' self-interest, some of which were seeking to ease
their stretched defense budgets by creating new, collectively financed, multi-national
force structures.cii
Therefore, the Atlantic Alliance's unexpected capacity of adapting to changed world-political conditions,
at the same time preserving and extending its traditional legitimization, can - paradoxically - not be
sufficiently explained by its autonomous institutional potential. Well corresponding to the institutionalist
axioms suggested above, such as discontinuity of change and multiple causation, a complementing
recourse to explanatory factors on the level of NATO's constitutive actors (which are and remain its
member states) is indispensable.ciii A perspective on the constitutive actors can also make clear that the
rapid common reaction to the emerging new challenges was not the 'evolutionary' result of enlightened,
entwined or multilateralized interests of the majority of NATO states (as neoliberalism could argue) but
rather an example of the principle of the "self-reliant optimality potential" of international "bargaining
solutions"civ.
Accordingly, the growth of international institutional forms is always co-determined by the will of the
relevant states to let the related developments pass beyond their direct, unilateral influence. In
international institutional settings, then, states typically loose abilities and opportunities to unilaterally
influence the related outcomes or organizational behavior to the credit of politically leveled,
"comprehensively efficient solutions".cv At the same time however, they gain the chance of bringing in
their own goals freely and (at least according to the fiction) without regard to their status or relative
position - whereas having to take on no exclusive responsibility for the consequences of the collective
solutions found, although each single state can profit from effective solutions, regardless of its own
contribution.cvi
Independently, this principle has recently been introduced in structural neorealist theorizing as "voice
opportunity"-proposition, borrowing from organizational theory.cvii Of distinguished interest here is "the
level of policy influence partners have or might attain in the collaborative arrangement."cviii Following on
from this, assumptions out of neorealist and organizational theory - taken each themselves, as argued
above, unsuited for adequately appreciating the process and determinants of NATO's adaptation - flow
together into an institutionalist argument that underscores the importance of 'soft', contextual factors in
rational state action and international cooperation. According to the voice opportunity thesis, and against
neoliberalism, states not only seek institutional arrangements to make cooperation cheaper and increase
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their individual substantive gains but also and arguably foremost to find conductive contexts and
opportunities to effectively articulate and circulate their national policies.cix
The voice opportunity proposition offers a common denominator for a bunch of developments significant
for the future of NATO and post-strategic security in Europe. It can, for example, well account for
France's rapprochement to NATO, assuming that the French government was seeking to broaden its
available contexts for national policy and interest articulation in the light of the Alliance's increasing
politicization after the end of bipolarity. Moreover, it can explain the success of NATO's initiatives for
cooperation with its former adversaries, PfP and NACC, as well as some former Warsaw Pact countries
pressing wishes to become regular members of NATO and Russian demands for a security charter
codifying its relation to the Alliance - as all these developments may be viewed as attempts to open up a
well-practiced institutional context, that of the Atlantic Alliance, for purposes of making oneself and one's
national policies more visible on a European scale.
Nevertheless, a complete institutionalist analysis of NATO's adaptation has to delve still further into its
constitutive context and look into the dimension of intergovernmental bargaining. Intergovernmental
bargaining can well account for the often not too well understood parallelism of different approaches to
institutionalize post-strategic European or Euro-Atlantic security cooperation as well as for the existence
of institutional fragments that seem not to fit into the current setting but despite endure and function. This
again hints upon the path-dependency and multicausality of institutional development and once more
suggests that there can be no one grand strategy of institutional design. Here is an instructive example
concerning intergovernmental bargaining about the shape of the envisaged European pillar of the
Alliance:cx
During the Bush Presidency, the United States were responding openly reserved to the reviving European
attempts to develop an own security and defense identity (and a related operative reactivation of the
WEU). The "Bartholomew telegram", a sharp diplomatic note the U.S. government sent to the thenSecretary General of WEU, Willem van Eekelen, harshly shattered the illusion that a harmonic parallel
institutional adaptation of NATO on the one hand and the WEU as well as the common-security policy
dimensions of the EU on the other could be accomplished. In a letter to all then-EC member states'
governments, then-Secretary of State James Baker repeated the objections expressed in the Bartholomewtelegram less sharply and at the same time made the Bush administration's acknowledgment and support
of the envisaged ESDI dependent on several criteria to be met by the Europeans: All related
developments should, in the final analysis, strengthen the Atlantic Alliance's effectiveness and keep it the
main forum for all questions of European security; NATO must be able to maintain and if possible even
deepen its integrated military structure; to avoid conflicts between the Europeans over the concrete shape
of ESDI which may also weaken the Alliance, all related considerations and steps should not be
undertaken but by all European NATO members together.
These U.S. demands rendered for example Germany in a precarious position, actually forcing it choose
between the transatlantic security link and its traditional security bilateralism with France. To this
decisional pressure added the fact that at NATO's Ministerial Meeting in Copenhagen in June 1991, the
U.S. had succeeded to thwart French plans for a rapid reaction force within the WEU in favor of a British
lead NATO-troop, which then became the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). In a
remarkable diplomatic move, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl managed to escape the imposed
decisional pressure through a package solution. In the "October initiative", together with the French
President François Mitterand, he announced the plan to incorporate the development of ESDI into the
creation of the European Union by making the WEU the then future European Union's defense
component. The first step into that direction, the initiative proposed, should be made by a combined
Franco-German corps, which in the meantime has become the Eurocorps. The almost parallel creation
and existence of the Eurocorps and the ARRC thus is a conspicuous expression of the just described
Euro-American and more specifically Franco-German-American interest conflict over the further
institutionalization of a European security identity and package strategy adopted by the Kohl-Mitterand
chief of government, or "COG", collusioncxi in order to defuse it.
This relevance of bargaining factors seems at first sight a strong argument for neoliberalism, but a closer
look makes it clear that neoliberal connotations of bargaining are too narrow-focused here. Typically, as
noted in the introduction, for neoliberalism bargaining entails intentionally establishing common
'institutional' constraints so to stabilize cooperation and overcoming the political market failure, that is
sub-optimal outcomes of cooperative arrangements where Pareto-optimal, 'perfect' outcomes would have
been reachable as well. Once established, those 'institutional' forms of international cooperation then, in
turn, are supposed to exert an enlightening effect on the national interest of the states involved. Apart
from the fact that considerations of such kind hardly deserve being called 'institutionalist' (for they do not
really allow to conceive of institutions themselves, their change and sustainability as distinct from the
interests of and cooperative phenomena between its constitutive actors), they cannot account for
discontinuous institutional developments. That is because the market-failure axiom and others may
answer the general 'how?' yet certainly do not answer the concrete 'why and when?' of cooperation. Also
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have they little to say about interdependence between 'actors' and institutional 'structures' and about how
much and how strong structural opportunities actors need to act effectively or, conversely, to what extend
positive structural effects on cooperative behavior are dependent on benign actors, or 'agents'.cxii
In addition to the mentioned state strategies of self-interest calculation and bargaining, also single creative
acts of individual actors are to be taken into consideration to arrive at complete explanations of the course
and content of NATO's institutional adaptation. For example, the Alliance's general strategy revision was
temporarily interrupted by derivative attempt to secure NATO's continued relevance and public support
by way of ad hoc-activism. An illustrating example is the Venice speech of May 1993, delivered by the
then-Secretary General Wörner, in which he proclaimed a tactic of selective shop-window operations. It
was much inspired by the assumption that NATO was in acute danger of loosing its obvious "raison
d'être", notably in the perception of its member states' electorates, and thus forced to present itself to the
world public as an indispensable provider of "security and stability"cxiii. For that sake, Wörner stressed, it
should not make available its capabilities to the U.N. but self-responsibly engage in such conflicts that
promise to be well-suited for making the Alliance's genuine "usefulness in dealing with immediate crises
and problems"cxiv. Consequently, Wörner cautioned, NATO would have to strictly refrain from any
intervention in conflicts and crises where not publicly visible success could be expected or where NATO
could not lead the related operations independently, especially in terms of military command and
controlcxv.
Underscoring NATO's further right to exist and its military operability in the face of post-strategic
security threats was an important but only the one side of the coin. There was still another challenge: to
elaborate a clear concept for the intended future military and political forms of defense cooperation and
integration, reflecting the post-strategic security condition on a long-term basis.cxvi

4.2 From Diffusion and 'Interlocking' to Functional Self-Restriction and 'Interacting'
This second side of the coin was soon realized, and thus after the episode of operational activism, the
Brussels Summit of January 1994 marked a turn to the questions of concrete structural adaptation. The
CJTF concept laid the basis for NATO's military-operative readjustment (the definitive design of which
however was not agreed upon before the Berlin Ministerial Meeting of June 1996) and the PfP program
with its bilateral cooperative arrangements based upon the respective concrete requirement took to
solving the question of a well-defined political and strategic outreach to Middle-Eastern and Eastern
Europe, beyond the diffuse idea of a general transfer of stability from West to East.cxvii
So the Summit of Brussels made a significant step towards revising the concept of the Alliance's
institutional adaptation from an at first seemingly envisaged diffuse catch-all approach to a more
promising strategy of functional restraint:

"In pursuit of our common transatlantic security requirements, NATO
increasingly will be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the
traditional and fundamental task of collective defense of its members, which
remains a core function. We reaffirm our offer to support, on a case by case
basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping and other
operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the
responsibility of the CSCE. ... Against this background, NATO must
continue the adaptation of its command and force structure in line with
requirements for flexible and timely responses contained in the Alliance's
Strategic Concept. ... As part of this process, we endorse the concept of
Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations,
including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance. We
have directed the North Atlantic Council, with the advice of the NATO
Military Authorities, to develop this concept and establish the necessary
capabilities. The Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities,
and in coordination with the WEU, will work on implementation in a
manner that provides separable but not separate military capabilities that
could be employed by NATO or the WEU."cxviii
Important to notice, much of NATO's adaptive endeavors are, despite its grown
institutional autonomy, still best accountable to national interest-calculations. Even the
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decision taken back in November 1991 to establish the NACC as an instrument to
defuse the immediate pressure to decide about the when, how and who of an eastward
expansion cannot sufficiently be explained as a deliberate policy of institution-building
but has also to be seen in the classical realist sense, that is, in the light of national
interests. In retrospect, NACC especially furthered two important German interests:
establishing an institutional framework to foster compliance with the disarmament
regulations of the treaty about Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and providing for
continued international safeguard of the reunification's consequences in the field of
European security (for example the subsequent expansion of NATO's military structures
and area of defense to the territory of former East Germany).cxix
France however took that as an attempt to set up a kind of German-U.S. bilateralism in European security
affairs, and anticipating political isolation, it replied with a counter-balancing strategy in the form of
institutional duplication. That way it sought to decrease the relative importance of the perceived increased
political importance of NATO and its new institutional ramifications such as NACC. This counterbalancing was realized with the help of WEU, which was supplemented by a consultative forum
consisting of selected East European countries.cxx Notably the French behavior was in perfect accordance
with the power-principle of classical realism and the structural logic of Waltzian neorealism - both
nowadays so often sweepingly reprimanded as obsolete.
Whereas NATO's initial post-Cold War strategic impetus, that is functionally confining itself to military
tasks, especially collective self-defense, has become visibly blurred in the course of the out-of-area debate
and subsequently in the enlargement discussion, a strategy of self-limitation would now as before be
appropriate and also advisable - for the Atlantic Alliance remains an indispensable and effective, but is
not any longer a comprehensive 'security provider'. When in November 1991 the North Atlantic Council
came up with the formula of "interlocking institutions"cxxi, it obviously believed the Alliance to be able to
play a general leading role in devising future European security structures and accordingly declared: "The
Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on
policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty."cxxii
This vision however soon found itself disappointed, when other European security institutions
promulgated their own, competing concepts for future European defense and security. The first step made
the newly founded European Union as soon as in February 1992 with the project for a common European
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), followed by the WEU with its Petersberg Declaration and the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which - symbol enough - assembled in
Helsinki, its founding location, and presented a comprehensive program for future European security. To
a large part, the history of European security politics after 1989/90 can indeed be written as a history of
"institutional rivalry".cxxiii
Given this institutional competition in general post-strategic European security issues, it is problematic
that after the end of bipolarity NATO - while militarily sticking to collective defense - politically has
repeatedly striven for a general involvement in the European broad political agenda, which it early
institutionalized in the form of NACC. So it has come that the concept of interlocking institutions under
political and strategic guidance of the Atlantic Alliance threatened to become in practice rather a
functionally unspecified, more reciprocally inhibiting than reinforcing juxtaposition of interblocking
institutions. That was of course also due to NATO's attempt to present itself as the leading 'stabilityprojector', which early enough adopted paradoxical forms.cxxiv For example, the Alliance not only
collectively admitted the Soviet successor states into NACC - despite of the involvement of three of them
either in war-type conflicts with one another (Armenia and Azerbaijan) or with secessionist groups
(Georgia). The member states of NATO also, while facing growing problems with their attempts to settle
the war in their immediate strategic neighborhood (ex-Yugoslavia), successively broadened the Alliance's
self-declared security guaranteeship: In June 1992 CSCE was officially offered operational support,
reaching up to NATO conducting peace-keeping operations under a CSCE mandate, and in December the
U.N. security council was offered an according kind of support.
Here once again the Berlin Ministerial Meeting of June 1996 marked a decisive turning point: Whereas
the communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the Defense Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group of
29 November 1995 still maintained that "[t]he Alliance continues to be the linchpin of European
security"cxxv, half a year later in Berlin NATO gave up its claim to a leading role in the interplay of
European security institutions, thus relinquishing the organizing principle of interlocking institutions and
turning to a new principle that could be termed the one of interacting institutions - namely a coordinated
interplay of the different post-strategic security strategies and institutions in Europe that does not rest
upon one lead-institution but rather on the idea of general common regulations for a well-defined
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functional sharing. Nonetheless, the different action units will not be isolated from one another but
interconnected especially by using common organizational modules.
That became most obvious in the NATO Council practically charging the West Europeans, respectively
the WEU, to develop an own military operability,cxxvi which effectively meant to establish the since the
times of De Gaulle so much debated European pillar within NATO itself. This pillar however is not to set
up a European parallel structure to the traditional transatlantic pillar, but in contrast to be "separable but
not separate" from it.cxxvii This is to be ensured by two structural interconnections: on the one hand the
concept of allied Combined Joint Task Force headquarters (CJTF HQs), that is, integrated operational
command and control nuclei attached to selected NATO commands but at the same time, as the case may
be, removable from NATO's command and control structure and available for 'Europeans-only'
operations, for example within the WEU framework; on the other hand the principle of double hatting,
that is, making forces answerable both to NATO and WEU.
CJTF perfectly exemplifies the path-dependency of institutional innovation, its co-determination by past
decisions and also the multiple causation of institutional change. Altogether, additionally to its strict
military-operational functions, CJTF can fulfill a fivefold coordinating task.cxxviii First, it can guarantee,
by developing clear-cut criteria, that multinational force units really become effectively integrated and
operative. So CJTF should help to counteract the tendency prevalent in some NATO countries to
contribute to multinational units, yet mainly in order to ease one's own defense budget and consequently
not ensuring that the respective forces are trained and equipped in a way that actually allows for
multinational interoperability. Second, CJTF can provide a common framework for joint exercises of
NATO and PfP nations' military forces, helping to smooth the way to enduring cooperation in military
and security affairs. Third, CJTF allows for linking NATO countries not (yet) integrated into the
Alliance's military structure (as it is currently the case for France and Spain) indirectly to that structure.
Fourth, CFTF HQs may serve as coordinating agencies between NATO and WEU or a future European
defense organization in the framework of the envisaged European security and defense identity.
Moreover, the CJTF HQs have the strategic function of providing WEU on a case-by-case basis with the
necessary military and command-and-control infrastructure for own operations. Fifth, as an additional
political function, CJTF HQs could act as connection authorities to the U.N. That way, a strong
coordinative cord, also defining clear political and operational responsibilities, could be established for
NATO-missions conducted in implementation of Security Council resolutions.
Confirming these observed trends towards an approach of interacting institutions, the Ministerial Meeting
at Sintra in May 1997 marked a further step to the Alliance explicitly acknowledging the multilateralized
character of post-strategic European security. As for the relationship between NATO and WEU, for
example, the final communiqué stated:

"We welcome agreement reached recently in the WEU on the participation
of all European Allies, if they were so to choose, in WEU operations using
NATO assets and capabilities, as well as in planning and preparing of such
operations; and on involvement, to the fullest extent possible and in
accordance with their status, of Observers in the follow-up, within the
WEU, of our meetings of Berlin and Brussels. We note that the basis has
therefore been established for the implementation of Ministerial decisions,
for the strengthening of NATO-WEU working relations and, in this
framework, for the development of the ESDI with the full participation of
all European Allies. This will ... contribute to setting the groundwork for
possible WEU-led operations with the support of Alliance assets and
capabilities."cxxix
4.3 The Mixed Menu of European Security Problems - NATO Expansion as an Example
Whereas the example of NATO's strategic adaptation has shown the elucidating contributions of
institutionalist methodology (such as path-dependency, discontinuity and multiple causation), the issuearea of NATO expansion poses ponderous theoretical questions. Briefly, from a theoretical point of view,
NATO enlargement is still quite a paradox. Judging by common theoretical perspectives, it should never
have come up - a fact that even Hellmann's and Wolf's seminal analysiscxxx of alternative theoretical
predictions about NATO's future overlooked. None of our common grand theories is able to explain why
at the Brussels Summit of January 1994, the Alliance members set the - albeit rather vague - sign of a
coming expansioncxxxi and subsequently followed a remarkably strictly according political course.
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Structural realism for example would absolutely acknowledge that international-political adaptive
pressure as arising from the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and some Russian neo-imperialist tendencies can
"shove"cxxxii Middle and Eastern European states towards NATO. Waltz deems national self-renunciation
of such kind abnormal in a sense, but concedes it possible if pursued for precisely the sake of a unit's own
survival.cxxxiii Alternatively, this trend could always be explained in terms of bandwagoningcxxxiv: In order
to secure their newly reached positions as sovereign powers, the loosing Alliance's members may choose
to figuratively jump on the train of the winning coalition. Alas, the whole enlargement discussion per se,
from a neorealist point of view, is perfectly at odds with the standard assumption of an immanent decline
of alliances after the loss of their immediate adversary. Waltz and Mearsheimer had prominently
predicted such an inevitable decline of NATO.cxxxv
Neoliberalism, on the other side, could always put NATO's continued existence as well as its envisaged
enlargement down to the fact that institutional forms are (for some important part at least) independent
forces in world politics, which - if only somehow functional - tend to preserve themselves or even to
widespread. Yet it cannot explain why any state should develop an interest in increasing the number of
Alliance members. That is because neoliberalism has to assume that states will always prefer small
cooperative arrangements - among other things because otherwise transaction costs would exceed the
respective calculations of individual gain.cxxxvi This surely also applies to the anticipated costs of national
adaptation to a broad revision of current common Alliance positions and bargaining about new political
and defense tasks and commitments - all likely necessities in case of enlargement. Accordingly, Keohane
himself declared institutional closure to be one of the cornerstones of neoliberal assumptionscxxxvii.
As for the question of NATO's and its member states' adaptation to a new membership structure, it again
becomes obvious that taking the historicity (or path-dependency) and multicausality of institutional
development seriously, it forecloses any hopes for rational grand design-type solutions. Increased
Alliance membership will strongly demand both strategic and institutional reforms - already so not to risk
to minimize its ability of collective decision-making. Moreover, as has often been overlooked, the
question of enlargement is not exclusively one of high NATO politics but also considerably concerns the
smaller member states (as for example Spain or Portugal), which will be facing severe cuts in their
military support programs.cxxxviii
An enlarged NATO of course will have to direct all its related capabilities eastward in order to establish
there as soon as possible feasible military structures and also lead up the new members' defense policies
to Western standards. Otherwise, the Atlantic Alliance would render itself hampered and consequentially
obsolete exactly by embarking on a strategy of institutional adaptation and innovation. Additionally, as a
consequence of expansion, currently comparatively well contained regional problems and conflict
potentials on the post-Soviet territory could newly pose themselves as common Alliance problems in one
go. NATO will therefore unavoidably have to take up the question of how to handle conflicts between
new members (whereas its historical record shows that it has not always performed well in defusing
conflicts between its old members, just to mention 'Suez' and 'Cyprus'). Institutionalization and
institutional adaptation should therefore not at all be equated with ameliorative conflict transformation as do many proponents of neoliberalism -cxxxix but can, conversely, trigger the escalation or amplification
of conflict as well as create new ones.
In well accordance with the classical realist national interest-doctrine, it has to be acknowledged anyway
that the question of NATO expansion is anything but an end in itself or the logical consequence of any
self-generating tendency of institutional evolution. Rather, single national decision-makers typically
handle it in a form that promises best compliance with their own interests. Great Britain for example has,
precisely due to its strongly NATO-oriented defense and security policy, never been especially interested
in fast enlargement. A then unavoidable temporary weakening of the Alliance would at the same time
considerably reduce Britain's say in international security affairs. It is different with the case of Germany,
which is characterized by a relatively small say in Alliance security matters - due to its nuclear poverty
and traditional multilateralism in security affairs. Accordingly, Germany has now and again tried to
present itself as an advocate of some of the newly independent states' desire for economy and security
integration. France's position was over long periods characterized by the fear of, having left NATO's
military integration in 1966, becoming politically isolated in the course of enlargement. The U.S. were
suspected to pull the wires, trying to secure themselves a strong political stance in the new Europe at the
expense of France.
Contrarily to the prevalent policy metaphors as for the future of European security, not the vacuumabsorbing projection of stability towards Middle and Eastern Europe is the decisive stake but the
foundation of general "behavioral regimes" in the "post-Soviet security space", reaching from minority
protection to arms control and crisis management.cxl Many features of the prospect for institutional
flexibility and fluidity of post-strategic European security have recently become obvious in the
institutional reform of NATO. Here it is conspicuous that security has fully become politics. This trend
was well exemplified by NATO's Berlin decision to set up a Policy Coordination Group (PCG). As for
Alliance politics in general, increasingly important is not the common reaction to a clearly defined threat
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and challenge by means of a new grand strategy or - speaking in terms of structural realism - the keeping
of a state's (or a whole alliance's) 'position' in the international 'power game' but the act of positioning
oneself in new regional frameworks and new general political settings.
Selective multi-state cooperation in changing coalitions will become both typical of and crucial for
NATO's relevance and effectiveness. This assumption is reinforced by the plans taken at Berlin to
implement the CJTF-concept directly into NATO's strategy and to adjust its command and headquarters
structure to CJTF-like needs. This requires on the side of the member states the willingness and ability to
(re)define their relations to NATO and with one another from issue to issue. Such a multilateralism will
entail different coalitions within the Alliance, as the case may be, for example for conflict-intervention in
implementation of U.N. resolutions, for humanitarian assistance or for purposes such as helping to
stabilize the transitions in Eastern Europe.
As regards the Alliance's concrete operational East European outreach, the clearest indicator for the
appropriateness of expecting a multilateralist approach is the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC) in May 1997. According to its Basic Document,

"[t]he Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as the successor to NACC, will
provide the overarching framework for consultations among its members on
a broad range of political and security-related issues, as part of a process
that will develop through practice. PfP in its enhanced form will be a clearly
identifiable element within this flexible framework. Its basic elements will
remain valid. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will build upon the
existing framework of NATO's outreach activities preserving their
advantages to promote cooperation in a transparent way. The expanded
political dimension of consultation and cooperation which the Council will
offer will allow Partners, if they wish, to develop a direct political
relationship individually or in smaller groups with the Alliance. In addition,
the Council will provide the framework to afford Partner countries, to the
maximum extent possible, increased decision-making opportunities relating
to activities in which they participate.
... The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will retain two important
principles which have underpinned the success of cooperation between
Allies and Partners so far. It will be inclusive, in that opportunities for
political consultation and practical cooperation will be open to all Allies and
Partners equally. It will also maintain self-differentiation, in that Partners
will be able to decide for themselves the level and areas of cooperation with
NATO. Arrangements under the Council will not affect commitments
already undertaken bilaterally between Partners and NATO, or commitments
in the PfP Framework Document".cxli

5. The National Dimension: Individual vs. Common Goods
5.1 Internal Linkages of Post-strategic Security Cooperation
However much the Atlantic Alliance deserves it, as explained above, to be conceived of
an increasingly self-reliant, remarkable stable institution with important corporate traits
beyond a mere narrow reflection of its member states' national interest calculations, it is
precisely that national context that any sound scholarly analysis and political conception
alike must not miss to decently appraise. When, in the context of the newly emerging
security challenges and the question of appropriate international institutions,
disseminating the idea of a "multipolar peace", "constitutional foundations of world
peace" and even a "post-modern" or post-strategic politics of peace,cxlii one should
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consequently focus upon those 'sub-strategic' determinants of its realization that lie
beyond grand strategy and a common existential threat.
The operative translation of multinational or 'common' transatlantic security beyond collective defense
will depend in the first case, as it has become clear over the past few years, on national calculations - be
they considerations of how to legitimate international military action in the face of their electorate,
questions of the transfer of operational control to a multinational force commander or 'classical' attempts
to maximize individual gains out of international cooperation at a minimized own contribution.

5.2 United States: Multilateralism and National Prerogative
Like the aftermath of World War II, the end of the Cold War brought the U.S. into a
paradoxical situation between the search for a peace dividend and the necessity to react
to new challenges and threats.cxliii Soon after 1945, they had realized that they were not
to face a new world order but for the first time in their history a genuine world-political
adversary, the Soviet Union with its Eurasic bloc, which had lead to a twofold political
response. In terms of moralpolitik, the U.S. responded by propagating the idea of the
'free western world' (as in the Truman doctrine of 1947), accompanied by a populist
anti-communism as it found its expression for example in the era of McCarthyism. In
terms of realpolitik, the response was the set-up of a world-wide system of alliances or
treaties and military bases to literally fence the Eurasic Communist bloc (policy of
containment), accompanied by a special not only militarily but also socio-economically
defined umbrella for Western Europe (OEEC, the later OECD).cxliv
Now, after the end of the Cold War, hopes for a new world order have once again been disappointed and
the vision shattered that the U.S. would now at last no longer have to be resort to power politics but be
able to replace the policy of containment by one of enlargement,cxlv that is the spread of democratic values
and practices. Once again, after the demise of the old a new, if diffuse, opponent has emerged. This new
opponent comprises, among others, the risks of nuclear proliferation, drug dealing, ethno-national conflict
constellations, militant so-called 'crazy states' and the hard to predict developments in the rim areas of the
former Communist bloc (for example Middle and Eastern Europe, Korea, China/Taiwan).
In terms of realpolitik, the response to these new security challenges could easily be derived from the
logic of containment, transformed into a strategy of trying to fence a 'generalized' enemy and enhanced by
the needs of international burden-sharing. In this regard, when discussing the strategic changes in U.S.
security policy after the Cold War, its one actually outstanding epochal shift is away from unilateral selfcommitment to European affairs and the strategic bondage to the 'old' continent after World War II,
through the Atlantic Alliance.
Still, the slackening of the bipolar overlay over Europe has lead to a paradoxical fundamental change in
the U.S. approach to that region. According to its Wilsonian 'Make the world save for democracy'tradition, the United States have early embarked on an enlargement strategy towards Eastern Europe. This
was, at least in its beginning, not so much a strategy of 'tough' organizational expansion (such NATO
enlargement) but rather an approach based on Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, calling for the spread
of democratic values and procedures.cxlvi This more cooperative and less 'expansionist' approach however
was closely accompanied by a legitimatory enterprise, directed not only to the U.S.' domestic electorate
but also to some Alliance member states that were seeking to slash their defense expenditures and to
minimize substantial contribution to NATO budget and force requirements.
The clue was found in the creation of the "security metaphor"cxlvii of the 'new threats' to Alliance security,
mainly posed by the aforementioned 'generalized enemy'. That approach however has increasingly
equated 'democratic' enlargement with Alliance enlargement and thus activated the traditional U.S.
military entanglement trauma. Namely, "expansion would convert an alliance designed to achieve clear
and limited security objectives in a relatively stable Cold War setting into a nebulous crisis-management
organization in a highly unstable post-Cold War setting. NATO would change from a defensive alliance
to protect the territory of member states from attack into an alliance to project force - a different mission
with a vastly different set of risks and obligations."cxlviii
Already the Clinton administration's definition of national security strategy makes it clear enough that in
the post-strategic U.S. defense and security perimeters, Europe has become but one region among others,
and possibly more important ones. The Clinton administration right started off looking for a whole system
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of "integrated regional approaches" as the primary frame of reference for security policy, so that the U.S.
as a "genuinely global power" would be able to realize its national interests within loose, multilateral
forms of international cooperative action.cxlix This however must not foreclose the option for unilateralism
when circumstances require it. As the already mentioned Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 of 4
May 1994, a kind of elementary doctrine for post-strategic security policy, states: "When our interests
dictate, the U.S. must be willing and able to fight and win wars, unilaterally whenever necessary. To do
so, we must create the required capabilities and maintain them ready to use."cl Even given those
principles, the Clinton administration clarified that "circumstances will arise, however, when multilateral
action best serves U.S. interests in preserving or restoring peace. ... Thus, establishment of a capability to
conduct multilateral peace operations is part of our National Security Strategy and National Military
Strategy."cli
As for engagement in multilateral peace operations, this approach calls for a system of post-strategic
security multilateralism in the sense of ad-hoc coalitions, utilizing common assets and operative frames,
subject to ad-hoc activation according to the situation and one's one interests. The approach is thus
exactly comparable to the one that has become a mainstay of Alliance-wide post-strategic multinationality
and interoperability in the form of the CJTF concept. As for U.S. national strategy, "multilateral peace
operations" are regarded as "an important component",clii yet the President made clear that "first, and
foremost, our national interests will dictate the pace and extend of our engagement"cliii. Accordingly,
deciding about the "When and How" of U.S. armed force deployments in multinational contexts will
always remain a Presidential prerogative.cliv
Consequently, to principles emerge. Firstly, multilateral peace operations will only find U.S. support if
they serve its immediate national interests and secondly, there will no transfer of operational command
over U.S. forces to a multinational force commander. Only necessary parts of operational control may be
transferred.clv Given those principles, two scenarios for U.S.-supported multinational security engagement
remain realistic. These are either a coalition of NATO countries authorized by a U.N. Security Council
resolution, such as the UNITAF mission to Somalia, or the IFOR/SFOR model, as realized in Bosnia,
with NATO and non-NATO countries conducting a joint operation, using common NATO assets and
NATO command and control structures, with a U.S.-lead NATO Major Subordinate Command (MSC)
taking the strategic lead - as AFSOUTH in the case of IFOR.

5.3 Great Britain: From Defense to Security
British military doctrine shows distinct features of the Anglo-Saxon legal and also
political culture with its emphasis on custom and precedence, that is, it typically arises
from agglomerated decisions and events.clvi Concerning multilateral peace operations,
political principles basing on example cases are yet to form. Even until 1992, security
policy found itself almost equated with wider national self-defense and defined in terms
of four conventional aims: maintaining a nuclear deterrent capacity, defending Great
Britain, contributing to West European defense and the defense of the East Atlantic and
the Channel.clvii
Great Britain, like France, has only lately begun to undertake the step "from defense to security", which in the face of new alliance-wide challenges - also comprises an orientation away from unilateral and
towards multilateral action in situations of crisis.clviii Quite different from Germany's position and
comparable to that of the U.S., Britain thus articulates no self-reliant interest in securing international
peace and stability. In contrast, it for a long time still emphasized the strictly national character of security
interests and consequently derives tree core functions of future British security policy: defending British
territory, warding off threats to national and Alliance-wide security and contributing to wider national
security interests in the sense of maintaining a benign international environment of peace and stability.clix
Not earlier than in the Defense Estimates of 1995clx can one witness a change in that policy, making it
better corresponding to the changed global setting. Now the following security functions are considered:
Maintaining an independent nuclear capacity,clxi adapting to NATO's new force structureclxii and taking
part in humanitarian missions as well as the "Provision of a Military Contribution to Operations Under
International Auspices"clxiii. It looks as if this is a revival of the dual stance doctrine as it was developed
after World War II and envisaged a double standing leg in defense policy. The dual stance doctrine
acknowledged Britain's demise as a world power at its strategic dependency on NATO, vice the U.S., but
at the same time attempted to maintain a genuinely British standing leg in defense affairs and defined it following the idea of global post-imperial British responsibility - in terms of the ability of unilateral
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military intervention virtually all around the world.clxiv Reviving this tradition, already the 1994 Statement
on the Defense Estimates started declaring that the United Kingdom disposes of one of the most splendid
capacities of worldwide military force projection, only being reached by the U.S., Russia and France.clxv
In contrast, because of Britain's undeniable strategic dependence on NATO assets and therefore on the
U.S. (or, turned positive, because of the British-U.S. "special relationship"), the Atlantic Alliance has
since its existence officially been regarded as an important framework for co-operative multinational
action. Additionally, its importance is increased by the fact that the majority of the British 'security' elite
sees essential advantages in Britain exclusively engaging within the NATO framework as far as
multilateral peace operations are concerned - and needless to say that Britain is to take over some of the
decisive military command positions in these contexts.clxvi British politicians well realize that they could
not win nearly half as much political influence in the EU or WEU as they could in NATO. Through the
transfer of the ARRC command to Britain for example, it gained the opportunity to have a part of its
national command an control structure financed by NATO, with the opportunity left to use then, as well
as the ARRC-assigned troops, for unilateral national operations whenever it wants. That way, the revived
dual-stance principle can not only be sustained in times of shrinking military budgets but also in the face
of the necessity to lastingly take some army troops in the planning for intern peace operations (for
example Northern Ireland).clxvii
Now as ever, Great Britain thus shows no interest in a sharing of sovereignty in the filed of defense and
security affairs. Recent British objections against the plan to make the WEU into an integral part of the
envisaged ESDI therefore have come as no surprise. Comparable to the position of the U.S., Britain
underscores the necessity to calculate in terms of the national interest. Consequently, military
contributions to multinational peace operations will always be made on a selective base, which leaves no
realistic alternatives to ad-hoc formed multi-state coalitions, typically within NATO.
In contrast to the U.S. however, Britain is not anxious to design international peace operations in a largescale fashion that promises to secure its success in advance. Rather, it tends to prefer medium- and small
scale actions because its colonial experience shows how difficult it can be to come to political terms with
the long-term consequences of massive military engagement in crisis regions.clxviii Accordingly, military
planning for out-of-area operations concentrates on the tasks related to "wider peace-keeping" and the
contingency planning centers, among others, around measures of conflict prevention, demobilizing,
military protection of civilians and humanitarian relief.clxix
Finally, in the face of continued cuts in the defense budget and in the military forces volume, a broad
operational engagement in a possible transatlantic security-multilateralism would, for the time being, not
a political option anyway. Especially if Britain seeks to maintain its share in the defense planning for
Europe, thus preserving the benefits stemming from its ARRC command, and at the same time remains
resolved to continue its military presence in Northern Ireland, which requires a broad basis for personnel
rotation, its out-of-area and short-of-war capabilities in general will be strongly limited over the next few
years.clxx

5.4 France: New Interests in International Integration in Defense and Security Affairs
France has been resistant to resigning of sovereign rights in the field of defense and
security all along.clxxi As it has not taken part in NATO's integrated military structure
since 1966 and only recently started to consider a return, one should assume that, for the
time being, the Atlantic Alliance has not been a significant frame of reference when
French military engagement short of war was at issue. Yet, the opposite is true.
Precisely because France seeks to avoid losses of national authority in defense and
security affairs, it has tended since the beginning of the post-strategic security era to
strongly relate to, and rely on, NATO (and not the U.N., WEU or CSCE, respectively
OSCE).
This is illustrated by the observation that while providing one of the largest personnel contingent for U.N.
operations, France is always concerned to achieve the best possible congruence between the nations
involved in conferring a U.N. mandate and those executing it. Ideally, this can be realized by the U.N.
'charging' NATO to implement a certain Security-Council sanction so that in consequence NATO states
take themselves into duty,clxxii as for example in the case of the IFOR mission. Due to this interest in the
Atlantic Alliance taking the lead of multinational peace operations, France had decided to take part again
in Military Council sessions even before officially announcing its decision to return in NATO's military
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bodies in December 1995 - though only on an ad-hoc basis and as far as peace-keeping questions were
concerned.clxxiii
The Atlantic Alliance is of prime importance to France for yet another reason. This is the French security
trilemma. Three different security interests that are hardly consistent with one another form it. If they can
be brought within some common context anyway, it is the one of NATO.
To begin with, and as the first component of the dilemma, also the French political elite is convinced that
European defense cannot be effectively provided for unless through an enduring transatlantic alliance.
Related to this insight however is the apprehension that the U.S. may prefer a selective strategy as a
political approach to Europe to an integrative multilateralism. That would mean to look for different
European cooperation partners, according to the situation in question, and that way not only undermine
the emergent first harbingers of a European security and defense identity but also isolate France. The key
event here was the Gulf war of 1991, during which French troops were placed under foreign (that is U.S.)
command and control for the first time since 1966. France's role in the operation Desert Storm let the
ambiguity of its traditional defense policy become obvious enough to trigger a national security
debate.clxxiv National positioning in relation to NATO then definitively proved ambivalent, if not
contradicting:clxxv
Without a doubt, France is thrown dependent upon cooperation with, and assets of, the U.S. in the defense
and security realm. The Gallo-Atlantic bilateralism founded therein meets a broad national consensus.
The Gulf war of 1991 however not only underscored Europe's, vice France's, strategic dependence on the
U.S. but also made clear that the U.S. were the only remaining genuine world power in terms of
autonomy in defense affairs as well as material and general strategic capabilities. This, in the classical
Waltzian sense, "shoved" France into a politics of counter-balancing that found its expression in the
efforts to face the Euro-Atlantic security partnership once again with the conception of a relatively
autonomous European pillar of NATO. The Copenhagen Ministerial Meeting of NATO in June 1991
provided an illustrative example. France forwarded a blueprint for a WEU-led rapid reaction force.
Although it failed, an important transatlantic compromise was reached: In turn to the continued personal
union between SACEUR - i.e. the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe - and CINCEUR - i.e. the
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. forces stationed in Europe -, the U.S. agreed on the plan to elaborate the
WEU into an integral part of a future European defense and security identity. A plan however that after
the Ministerial Meeting of Berlin in June 1996 and the final acceptance of the CJTF concept seems to
have become obsolete and is now not only being objected by Britain but also by France itself.
The second component of the security trilemma arises from the two basic aims - Franco-American
bilateralism and at the same time a European defense and security identity or at least an autonomous
European military pillar - being hard to combine and to politically realize simultaneously, which however
is decisive for abating the security trilemma. Both components cannot be reconciled but under the aegis of
a national rapprochement to the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, France must have a strong interest in
establishing an own European defense and security identity which however must just not lead to
uncoupling the U.S. France's declaration of June 1996 not only to return into NATO's military
committees but also to consider its military reintegration was surely pushed forth by the NATO Council's
Berlin decision to explicitly task the WEU with setting up an own European defense capability on the
basis of the CJTF concept. Accordingly, every engagement decision will be taken in the North Atlantic
Council, which means unanimity and inclusion of the U.S., and the (multinational) CJTF headquarters to
set up will be available both to NATO and WEU, just as the assigned troops will be double-hatted, that is,
answerable both to NATO and WEU.clxxvi
Additionally, as the trilemma's third component, French security policy seeks to obviate two threat
scenarios at the same time, requiring different partners, respectively: Germany for guarding against a
potential Eastern threat (of which, at least for some, Germany appears as a part) and Italy together with
Spain and Portugal for handling the more manifest Southern threat as it results, among other things, from
the legacies of colonialism. These twofold French post-strategic security interests become symbolically
obvious the parallel interest in two different institutional forms: Eurocorps (with Germany as continental
'center power') and EUROFOR/EUROMAR (with Italy, Spain and Portugal as Mediterranean countries
vis-à-vis the North African crisis potential).
All these aspects, to sum up, have currently resulted in a changed French policy towards NATO that
combines elements of the since 1966 practiced transatlantic selectivity with elements of a new
rapprochement.clxxvii First circumstantial evidence of these emerging trend could be observed since some
time before the 'spectacular' French decisions of December 1995 and June 1996. Taking part, for
example, in the operation Deny Flight over Bosnia and the enforcement of the embargo against Serbia
and Montenegro, French troops had indirectly returned into NATO's military integration months before.
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5.5 Germany: The Dilemma of Double Normality and Historical Defense Policy
Traumas
During the Cold War, a common coin phrase said that the predominating national
interests of the Federal Republic of Germany consisted in not having any, and there is
still some truth in it. Common assessments of the current state and recommendations for
the future of German foreign and defense policy pose it in the dilemma of double
normality, being caused by commonly confounded two discrete and conflicting
perspectives from which united Germany may be examined and its foreign and defense
policies judged. Viewed as a 'new' Germany, it is attributed increased political and
military capabilities and obligations, whereas regarded as an enlarged 'old', it is
expected to impose itself restraints and adhere to international expectations regardless
of any own interests so to forestall any new raising fears of Germany clxxviii.
In consequence, united Germany is sometimes seen as a "bigger and better" civilian power, abdicating
any military engagement,clxxix or in contrast as suffering from "Machtvergessenheit" (power oblivion) and
falling prey to a universal multilateralism instead of following own national interestsclxxx. By some,
moreover, it is viewed as a "great power with many options"clxxxi, "ripening" geo-politically,clxxxii and
being able, and capable, to chose autonomously the international way it desires. Others speak of a "new
assertiveness"clxxxiii and accuse Germany of desiring predominance in Europe, arguing in contrast to those
seeing it as a "pressured power"clxxxiv between a variety of incompatible international urges and
expectations, between increased "opportunities" and "obligations",clxxxv leaving it no space to devise
genuine national-interest and long-term conceptions.
Given these diverse assessments and predictions, the ending of Germany's constitutional special condition
by the Federal Court's Bundeswehr sentence must not let forget that a consensus, or at least a political
discourse, about the envisaged multilateral action frames of German post-strategic security politics as
well as about procedural questions (for example rules of engagement and questions of command and
control transfer to a multinational force commander) are not in sight. According to the Whitebook 1994,
German vital national security interests consist, among others, in "a policy of networking and of fair
balance in, for and with the community of nations."clxxxvi Yet also, or rather especially, after the
Bundeswehr sentence, a political guideline is indispensable that would contain general regulations for
short of war military operations, which are transposable to the needs of actual missions in question. There
is a whole spectrum of conceivable post-strategic peace operations. They may involve military action of
different forms and grades and thus German decision-makers will have to decide which of those forms
they favor so to sensibly derive the necessary and adequate financial, material and military contribution.
Quite different from these political shortcomings, the Federal Government and the Ministry of Defense
have developed a political interest in participating, on an ad-hoc basis, in international peace operations.
Accordingly, much effort was made to adapt national units to NATO's new force structure, with a special
view to crisis reaction forces. Despite of its world-community rhetoric and like the other countries
examined here, Germany interestingly shows no decisive interest to actively contribute to U.N. peace
operations on a large scale but concentrates on NATO-led operations.clxxxvii An active contribution to
NATO operations is seen to be an effective instrument to increase general German influence in the
Atlantic Alliance: "It is the aim to make an effective contribution to NATO's crisis reaction forces in
particular, which is in keeping with Germany's role in the Alliance and establishes a qualified say".clxxxviii
This nevertheless is not the effect of a sometimes-maintained trend toward a creeping renationalization of
German defense politics or a worldwide German interventionism. Rather, it is the effect of a specific
cognitive scheme, or operational code, of the German defense and security elite, largely informed by
historical experience. It developed during the first years of West German rearmament (1955) on the
grounds of the Federal Republic's nuclear dilemma, which consisted and still consists in the fact that
Germany disposes of no nuclear weapons and thus has traditionally had repeated difficulty in claiming a
say in NATO strategy matters and was sometimes about to be de-coupled from the general strategic
development of the Alliance.clxxxix Consequently, it has always been of prime importance to make an
important non-nuclear contribution so to be indirectly able to claim a sensible say in pivotal strategic
issues and moreover to try to anticipate the evolution of NATO's military strategy in order to adjust one's
conventional contributions as well as possible to it. That is, in Hanrieder's classical formulation, to strife
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for optimal international "compatibility".cxc To a large extend, thus, "West German security policy
became synonymous with Alliance policy. ... In international affairs, Germany assumed what might be
called a 'instinctive multilateralism' ... Instead of pursuing specific national interests, West German
security followed general aims."cxci
In the course of this, however, over the years the trauma emerged that almost ever when those
compatibility decisions were taken with all the necessary domestic political debates and compromises and
were about to be implemented, the international situation and NATO's strategic response would change,
rendering Germany's adaptation efforts obsolete in large parts. Compare the following historical
sketch:cxcii After joining in 1955, every effort was made to set up a conventional defense capability that
promised to make an adequate contribution to West European defense according to NATO's Lisbon
Program of 1952. Yet shortly after beginning to levy the first Bundeswehr units, NATO's change from the
conventionally based Lisbon strategy was beginning to be replaced by what in 1957 became NATO's new
strategy of massive retaliation, widely known as MC 14/2. This caused Germany the need to make a hard
turn in its just begun defense policy and force structure planning, and a flaming domestic debate about a
nuclear arming of the Bundeswehr started. The plans for a nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr at fist
were well compatible with U.S. plans for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF). In 1964 however, the U.S.
gave it up and Germany no saw itself urged to join the now envisaged nuclear nonproliferation treaty
(NPT). Into the bargain, NATO's Harmel Report of 1967 and the new strategy of flexible response, or
MC 14/3, laid much emphasis again on conventional forces, the buildup of which Germany had
postponed due to the expected nuclear armament.
In the beginning post-strategic era, the complex of anticipated traumas caused new adaptation effects.
This becomes widely obvious an a statement by General Naumann, then-Generalinspekteur of the
Bundeswehr, who argued that "the Western Alliance not only offers security to our country but also
creates ... far-reaching possibilities to influence the security policy of the partners. This is of vital interest
for a non-nuclear nation like Germany".cxciii Therefore, the reform of Bundeswehr structures, anyway
necessary because of the integration of the GDR's Nationale Volksarmee, was also used to adapt national
force structures to NATO's new triad of basic organization, main defense forces and crisis reaction forces,
as agreed in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept of Rome, November 1991. The result were the attempts
often reprimanded as remilitarization to increase, or rather establish, basic national command and control
capabilities for out of area and task force operations beyond individual and collective self-defense.cxciv
Nevertheless, this strategy did not show the desired positive effects.
One reason was that official German plans for an increased peace-keeping engagement obviously overstretched the available resources and consequently risked, in the general tradition of "Genscherism"
(named after former foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher) in German foreign and defense policy, to
get stuck in the rhetorics of "Verantwortungspolitik" (politics of responsibility) and a moral
overcommitment.cxcv Consequently, as Timothy Ash pointed out, "with increased demands on limited
resources, the danger is that by trying to do everything Germany will end up achieving nothing."cxcvi
Additionally, repetitive spontaneous cuts in the force figures and defense budget, for several years
accompanied by confusing domestic debates about the future scope, extend and mode of German 'peace
politics' have partly led to the international perception that Germany after all is not really interested in
broadening its role in the Atlantic Alliance and actually resuming more responsibility.cxcvii In fact, for the
time being, Germany remains unable to command any peace support operations exceeding 20.000
troops.cxcviii

5.6 Consequences for the Policies of NATO Engagement and Enlargement
The ascertained predominance of national-interest calculations in post-Cold War
Alliance politics and security engagement at first is, of course, another instance of the
continued appropriateness of (neo)realist reasoning. But at the same time, it shows that
neorealism should open itself to insights provided by the less structuralist and more
historico-political or textual approach as promoted by critical social theory and critical
security studies. Well exemplifying the importance of the institutionalist principle of
path-dependency, the tendency of a renationalization on Western national security
policies can well be accounted for on the ground of what could be termed the identity
hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that the loss of a common existential threat has
posed all high-stake players of the Cold War period into the predicament of redefining
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their roles and interests in the face of no common, 'objective' reference points.
Consequently, by far not only Germany, but also the U.S. and others are compelled to
find an appropriate way of self-positioning in the new security setting, which allows for
much less structural, balance-of-power type, strategic and military capability-guided
reasoning.cxcix
Even if this should not lead one to subscribing to the over-sketched axiom of a totally de-objectivated
"no-essentialist character" of security and security politics,cc it a least underlines the fact that no nation
can continue to define its security and security strategy on the grounds of a mere program of delimitation
against well-defined, objective 'threats' and 'adversaries' but at the latest by now is forced to "write" its
security policy and security condition by itselfcci. Post-strategic security politics then are, to a large
extend, interpretatory politics of identity.
Yet apart from those theoretical considerations, the relevance of the national dimension of Alliance
politics has an important practical consequence in that it suggests an important practical implication as for
the question of adequate policy guidelines for the future role of NATO. The suggestion is that NATO, in
continuing its process of institutional adaptation and enlargement, should refrain from adopting to diffuse
political responsibilities and claiming a too broad functional spectrum in post-strategic security politics.
Such a policy guideline could cross with national peace operations doctrines of its members as well as
cause them balancing behavior against some other members, naturally at the expense of NATO's
continued effective political as well as military integration and operativeness.
Moreover, as neorealist alliance theory could argue, NATO should in any case restrict itself to military
tasks and common military politics in a comparatively narrow sense so not to risk its positive functional
specificity to wither away. It is to a large extend exactly that functional specificity that has kept NATO
attractive to its members, and arguably made it so attractive to its prospective members. As Henry
Kissinger cautioned,

"The task before us is nothing less than to distill a sense of direction from a
world in which almost all key elements are changing simultaneously.
Stability in Europe requires reaffirming the centrality of NATO rather than
diluting it in an abstract multilateralism."ccii
Any strategy seeking to render NATO in a prominent functional role in any question of European security
- from humanitarian concerns to collective defense and the vision of an all-regional system of collective
security - has to be regarded with sincere reservations. Otherwise, the Alliance would risk drifting into a
mere expression of common value orientations, but de facto be drifting in hovering "désuetude".cciii That
way, it may risk to become just another security codex formulation agency with little effective value
when it comes to a clash between the values proclaimed and the national interest:

"Consider the Budapest Document adopted at the December 1994 CSCE
Summit. Its 'Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security'
requires that when armed forces are used for internal security purposes that
force be commensurate to the needs for enforcement and that due care be
taken to avoid injury to civilians or their property. Only a few days after this
CSCE Document was agreed, however, Russian forces began their alarming
campaign in Chechnya, resulting in heavy civilian losses and hundreds of
thousands of internally displaced persons."cciv
Hence, looking at the principles put forward in the Study on NATO Enlargementccv, a clear caveat is in
order, for the political strategy finally recommended to bring NATO on the course of enlargement indeed
involves much functional diffusion. Although the study is anxious to point out strategies (such as
intensified military and peacekeeping cooperation and joint operations with the new members) to ensure
that enlargement will strengthen the Alliance, it still in large parts seems to conceive of NATO
enlargement as a general political evolutionary process almost parallel to enlarging the European Union
with a common all-European zone of political and economic stability as leading motive. Alliance
enlargement, according to the study, shall lead to a new role of NATO as a complementary part of an
"inclusive European security architecture" together with the OSCE.
These rhetorics aside, one must not forget that, as neorealist alliance theory suggests, the classical
security dilemma can still today become interest- and policy-determining, though in the changed form of
a not international-political but alliance-internal dilemma (being insecure about the allies' politics and
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how sustainable for example issue-specific cooperation with them will be).ccvi If this is true, it is one more
strong argument for NATO sticking to functional specificity. This necessity is underscored by some
tendencies of a free fall in national defense readiness and overall NATO military capability: "The NATO
infrastructure budget has shrunk by 60 per cent in four years, and the NATO Defense Ministers warned
on 15 December 1995 of 'shortfalls ... especially related to support for reaction forces, ground-based air
defense and strategic mobility'."ccvii
Adhering to functional specificity does not, of course, mean that the Alliance should devote itself to
seeking do redefine post-strategic defense and security politics into all-out war military strategy. In the
post-strategic security realm, military aspects of security in a broader sense by far not only refer to
classical war scenarios or military intervention but also play an important role in peaceful management of
internal conflict and democratic consolidation. Functional specificity in the area of the military
dimensions of security thus

"includes the facilitation of transparency in national defense planning and
the enduring democratic control of the armed forces. The expression
'democratic control of the military' is generally understood as the
subordination of the armed forces to democratically elected political
authorities; it means that all decisions concerning the defense of the country
must be taken by those elected to take charge of the country's affairs. ...
There are a variety of reasons why it is important to professionalize the
armies of Eastern and Central Europe. In conditions of internal instability,
domestic strife or civil turmoil, the military can represent a relatively stable
element and source of order. ... While there is no single model, there are
several fundamental characteristics: a clear legal and constitutional
framework; the hierarchical responsibility of the military to the government
of the day through a civilian Minister of Defense; qualified civilians to work
with the military in the elaboration of defense requirements and the
agreement of defense policy and budget; the clear division of professional
responsibility between civilian and military and; the effective oversight and
scrutiny of parliament."ccviii
Reconciling divergent national interests in the face of concrete post-strategic security
tasks such as IFOR once again underscore the need of a continued focus on NATO
military cohesion, operativity and capability of short-term contingency planning and
implementation. Consequently, especially in the face of the coming enlargement process
with public and much of the political awareness on its political implications, one must at
least equally heed the military dimension. The focus should be upon sustainably
realizing six principles, which the Military Committee agreed upon in March 1994:
" (1) Preserve the integrated military structure;
(2) Assure separable but not separate forces in support of the European
Pillar;
(3) Maintain a single command structure for both Article 5 and nonArticle 5 missions;
(4) Retain the role of the Military Committee in transmitting strategic
guidance from the NAC to NATO military authorities;
(5) Avoid ad hoc participation in NATO bodies; and
(6) Preserve the capability of the Major NATO Commanders to undertake
timely contingency planning."ccix

6. Practical Implications: Towards a Post-strategic Security
Multilateralism
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Now the praxeological question remains which form of international cooperation in
post-strategic security politics appears realistic in the lights of the presented findings
and the just elaborated characteristics of post-strategic security. In addition: What will
be the most feasible and likely institutional form of future Euro-Atlantic security
relations? Also here a genuinely institutionalist perspective can help, as the one
provided by the newly developed approach of "multilateralism"ccx. When seeking to
forestall the appearing trend of à-la-carte post-strategic security, basing upon ad-hoc
decisions in the wake of national self-interests, a multilateral-institutional approach
offers itself as a suitable mid-term leading conception.
Such a security multilateralism offers itself as a promising mid-term oriented leading concept. In contrast
to pure ad-hoc cooperation on the one side or fully 'communalized' security politics on the other,
multilateralism appears as a realistic and stable meso-integrative political and operational action form that
both bears respect of important national observations and prerogatives and at the same time overcomes
the narrow limits of mere case-dependent cooperation in security affairs and thus will be able to make an
important contribution to crafting the Atlantic Alliance for its political and operational future in the
coming era of post-strategic security. Within such a multilateral security community, some important
common procedures and shared interests will emerge, which however must not be understood as strictly
functionally or issue-bound. Nevertheless there would also be well-attuned national and multinational
decision-making procedures in concrete questions of prospective military operations, as well as clear
rules of engagement.
The formation of a common European and transatlantic post-strategic security community will thus
neither follow a "master plan" nor a mere "trial and error"-principleccxi but rather developmental paths
shaped by national interests and prerogatives as well as institutionally solidified fundaments (for example
the Atlantic Alliance as an organized institutional form, EAPC or CJTF HQs as institutional amendments
and common historico-political experiences within IFOR or SFOR in Bosnia). In the end, it will always
by crucial how the qualities and capabilities of cooperation and integration reached up to a certain point
of time proof effective (or not) in the light of concrete security challenges. This kind of single-case utility
principle of general cooperation and integration has already manifested it self in the development of the
CJTF-concept with its emphasis on multinational headquarters cells and multinational-multifunctional
forces. This concept - unexpectedly and unpredictably - well fitted the requirements posed by the decision
to set up the multinational IFOR troop, namely coordinating a combined operation of NATO and nonNATO countries and establishing the required command and control structures.
One can hence expect the emergence of a kind of dual system of European and transatlantic security. The
first of the two interdependent components forming it would be a sufficient defense capability for the case
of classical geostrategic threats, reflected in suitable forms of high-level military cooperation and
integration - keeping in mind that the related command and control structures at the same time also
represent the preconditions of conducting effective multinational operations precisely beyond collective
defense and short of war. The second component would consist in sufficiently institutionalized forms of
selective and graded reaction to sub-strategic security challenges or support tasks for U.N. operations.ccxii
This also seems as the only viable solution to the problem of mission creep, that is a stepwise, hard to
notice and therefore 'creeping' change in the initial situation or tasks of a military peace operation or
conflict intervention so that they consequently either come into obvious contradiction to the original
political and operational rules and goals of the mission or at least hamper its progress and effectiveness.
Ad-hoc arrangements cannot reach the capacity of steady adaptation required here, just because the
political preconditions, complementary initial interests and compromises that have actually made the
operation possible must not steadily be questioned and redefined. General, evolved and adaptive but
nevertheless 'institutionalized' rules of engagement forming a sort of NATO peace-keeping doctrineccxiii
for post-strategic NATO operations - be they conducted in implementation of U.N. resolutions, by NATO
as such, or by state coalitions using some NATO assets - could help defuse this problem. The CJTFconception could serve as a good organizational background.
The decisive national prerequisite for such a security multilateralism to emerge and also for a successful
implementation of the CJTF conception will be, in addition to a sustainable internal-political compromise
about decision procedures and political objectives, the creation of suitable military capabilities, especially
concerning secured international interoperability in the sense of "complementary militaries"ccxiv.
Moreover, the concerned national forces must not only be multilaterally but also multifunctionally
employable - from peacekeeping to genuine military operations. Defense and force planning then would
have to change from the primacy of individual and collective self-defense toward the whole spectrum of
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possible military operations in the service of post-strategic security, that is, it should center around
multilateral responses to cases of "'complex emergency'".ccxv

7. Conclusion and Outlook
As the analysis has shown, NATO's specific long-standing functions enshrined in the
Articles 2, 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, such as providing for broadly-defined
regional security, forming a reliable international milieu for projecting political and
economic stability or serving as a framework for developing sustainable peaceful and
stable relations between its member states, have remained remarkably unquestioned and
even been reaffirmed by the system-change in Europe 1989-1991.ccxvi However, NATO's
procedures and politics to fulfill these functions and realize these aims are to be
redefined and where necessary redesigned due to the changed political setting and scope
in and under which the Alliance now is operating in. The clearest signs for this need are
the various summits and ministerial meetings held by the North Atlantic Council, which
were to a lower degree concerned with questions of goal-setting than they were with the
problem of how to adapt the Alliance's political and military organization so to keep the
goal-attainment processes effective. Primarily, NATO had, and still has, not to redefine
its functional role but its operational prerequisites to comply with it.
There are, of course, some questions relating to goal setting. Generally speaking, whereas during
bipolarity the pivotal issue was how to maintain Alliance relevancy and effectiveness through unity and
integration, now it is how to maintain alliance relevancy and effectiveness through multiplicity and
differentiation. This not only reflects the new political shape of Europe and corresponding new national
interests of its member states but also the specific character of the post-strategic security challenges
NATO is and will be facing. The step is in the latter respect one from common reaction to graduated
reaction according to the functional needs posed by the single case in question. The challenge is despite
not to plunge into an 'ad hocery' and à la carte cooperation here.
As for theory, the adduced examples stand both for the necessity of an integrated institutional perspective
on European security (with path-dependency, discontinuity and multiple causation as methodical pillars)
and the missing of a serious institutional approach or a common institutional theory of international
politics. The question often enough is not one of neorealism vs. neoliberalism, neither one of
traditionalism vs. critical social theory, but one of adequately bringing them all in with their respective
strengths according to the case in point.
An overarching institutionalist perspective could for example unite the neorealist and neoliberal approach
to post-strategic international cooperation. Within such a broader framework, neoliberalism, according to
the findings presented here, could especially contribute to understanding and explaining the (continued)
need for cooperative structures, that is, elucidating the according institutional core conditions. NATO in
particular distinguishes itself by a multiple institutional sub- and outbuilding (such as permanent
multinational headquarters, amending cooperative agreements and consultative bodies - for example PfP
and NACC, now flown together into the EAPC - or an own institutional representative, the Secretary
General). This institutional structure, and here neorealism's strength comes in, offers the member states
various opportunities to articulate and pursue national interests. In this context, neorealist approaches
could make an important contribution to explaining and predicting the concrete shape and contents of
institutionalized cooperative forms in their specific functionality.
The findings further suggest for instance that after the dissolution of the bipolar "overlay", national
security policy is more conditioned by "historical" than systemic pressure. Thus, research should
concentrate on the "culture of national security"ccxvii. Especially, recent developments in German security
policy and its self-envisioned role in NATO cannot be explained just by resorting to common (neo)realist,
neoliberal or intergouvernementalist axioms such as (respectively) securing its relative position in the
international system, devising enlightened 'international' interests or playing two-level games between
domestic and international win sets. Rather, analysis should try to grasp the typical problématique of its
subject. As the question of the factors forging the ambiguous appearance of German security policy in the
1990s makes clear, historico-cultural and political-psychological co-determinants have to be taken into
account.
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However much an institutionalist methodology as advocated in this study offers important tools for
checking the process of NATO's institutional adaptation for its underlying causes, comparatively
checking related theoretical assumptions and finally devising a forecast and recommendation for the
future shape and organization of post-strategic security in Europe with the Atlantic Alliance playing a
prominent role, one important caveat is in order: Institutionalist methodology, by its very name, must not
disguise that to a large extend, setting up a European security architecture and placing NATO in that
structure are not problems of institutions and their relationships but problems of the respective nations
belonging, or not belonging to, those institutions.
As regards policy guidelines for the future of NATO and its military structure, one should neither argue
for a full 'politicization' of the Alliance nor for an operational 'hyper-flexibility'. Over-politicization may
result in rendering the Alliance's military component, albeit from progressively ineffective, increasingly
invisible - thus undermining both the benefits of post-strategic deterrence and many members' interest in
continued integration. Hyper-flexibility, for example in the wage of the CJTF-concept, surely would
contribute to short reaction times and increased defense capabilities to meet uncertain and locally
dispersed risks but also dissipate the Alliance's image and strength as a widely visible integrated security
organization. Yet is precisely that operational hard core and institutional visibility beyond strategic
myths or mere representational politics of imagined-identity construction that NATO has so much
invested in over the decades and that has, in retrospective, always turned out to be the driving force not
only for its own continued integration and general relevance but also for the future course of transatlantic
and European security. And this the more that it caused debates and strains both within the Alliance and
the broader pan-European context - just to mention the NATO crisis of 1966/67 and the adoption of the
strategy of flexible response or, needless to say, the 1979 crisis, the double-track decision and subsequent
debates about its consequences and implementation.
The troublesome shaping process of a post-strategic European and transatlantic security structure is an
outstanding example of the path-dependency of political institution-building and adaptation. What
especially marks the post-strategic security realm as distinct is the foreclosed option of a clear
institutional 'new' beginning, for almost all of the institutional forms of the Cold War era 'survived' the
vanishing of its founding conditions and were quick to adopt, or at least declare the adoption of, new
responsibilities and functions. This makes it unrealistic, as it will still be undertaken sometimes, to seek to
construct and realize an all-comprising European security structure based on clear-cut functional
differentiation and 'synergy' between the existing institutions.
It seems as if we will have to live with a new security paradox: The 'new' internationally relevant
conflicts seem to denounce the state-centric model insofar as they are precisely of sub- or transnational
origin. Yet at the same time, as experience from Somalia to ex-Yugoslavia suggests, obviously only can
be effectively countered with recourse to capabilities and strategies particular to the nation-state system.
The once criterion of NATO's success, that is not to make operational use of its assets, now seemingly
muted into a danger for its continued relevance. Moreover, whereas some forty years of joint NATO
planning for military contingencies mainly considered all-out war scenarios and the ability to collective
crisis-response, in the coming era of post-strategic security the Alliance will see itself faced with a
continued crisis: Challenges abound insofar as its enemy has become generalized and multi-faceted, and
so have the likely scenarios for Alliance action. This Alliance engagement again will and can not any
longer follow the principle of collectivity but one of selectivity, for example in the form of coalitions of
the willing (including non-members) as envisaged in the CJTF concept. Still, there should be clear
underlying and well-institutionalized rules for Alliance engagement so to avoid the aforesaid problem of
'hyper-flexibility' and its generally disintegrating effects.
In the final analysis, NATO's role in post-cold war Europe is, and will remain, paradoxical in historical
perspective - which is a necessary consequence of its political and military successes and institutional
adaptability. The problématique of the system-change in Europe in its theoretical and practical
consequences for the future role of the Atlantic Alliance forms is interwoven and multi-layered and does
not allow for final solutions, political or theoretical. As for politics, it permits for no more and no less
than situation-specific compromises and solutions, which however, precisely therefore, should follow a
clear political line and realistic leading concept and not take up the Euro-euphoric rhetorics of other
institutions. For almost half a century, NATO and its members have successfully lived and acted under
various world-political and Euro-regional conditions, and the Alliance has made indispensable
contributions to regional and transatlantic, as well as arguably global, cooperation and stability, by far not
only defined in military but also in general political terms. This it owed in the first place to the prudent
politics of its member states' governments and the almost ever-prevailing ability and willingness to make
constructive compromises.
To maintain this ability and preparedness together with the related reciprocally attuned values, interests
and modes of behavior for the next century and to sustainably embed the mew members in to them will be
the greatest challenge and chief test for the Alliance's stance in the new Europe.
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